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INTRODUCTION
Julie, a seventeen-year-old girl, lies awake in her freshman dorm room
grappling with her faith. She spent the day at the hospital with her
roommate who was diagnosed with mononucleosis. The roommate was
bedridden for several days before she finally decided to go to the emergency
room. The physicians decided to keep her overnight for observation, but felt
that she would be ready to go home the next day with proper medication.
Julie's family was actively involved in the Christian Scientist faith, and
they did not believe in conventional medical treatment. She was brought up
to believe that illness is not caused by viruses and bacteria, but rather by not
being spiritually whole with God.2 Despite her traditional beliefs, Julie
feared that she would "catch" the disease. She spoke with her parents earlier
in the day and they told her that mononucleosis was the "kissing disease,"
and that the roommate's insistence on behaving impurely distanced herself
from God resulting in her suffering.
Julie had no trouble reconciling her parents' statements with her
roommate's illness. After all, she was always telling Julie about her late
night partying and the different boys she had been with. But Julie did not go
to parties. She had never "made out" with any boys, nor did she plan to.
She thought she felt whole with God.
What troubled Julie was that the physicians at the hospital told her that
because of the close proximity in the dorm rooms, she was at risk for having
mononucleosis, and should be tested. Julie informed them of her religious
beliefs, and declined the test. The physician respected her decision, but told
her of the potential dangers of untreated mononucleosis. Julie lay awake in
bed, wondering what she would do if she did have mononucleosis.
At school, she learned of many different religious beliefs to which she had
never before been exposed. She questioned whether her beliefs were more
or less true than any of her friends who worshipped in different ways.3 She
wanted to discuss her confusion with her parents, but knew she could not.
They were against her going to a secular college and warned her about the
dangers of questioning her beliefs. Perhaps these questions would not make
her whole with God and susceptible to mononucleosis. She knew she did
not want to die, and fell into a restless sleep.
Now imagine Shannon, but instead of lying awake, she is lying in a
diabetic coma hours before her death. Shannon is a sixteen-year-old homeschooled member of the Faith Tabernacle religion. Like Julie, her family
does not believe in medical treatment. When she began feeling sick a few

2.

Janna C. Merrick, SpiritualHealing, Sick Kids and the Law: Inequities in the

American HealthcareSystem, 29 AM. J. L. & MED. 269, 271 (2003).
3.

See infra Part V (discussing religious development in minors).
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days earlier, she and her family began praying that she would get better.
When Shannon was ten, her nine-year old brother died from complications
arising from an ear infection. Her parents prayed continuously, but
apparently God's plan was not for her brother to live. Maybe she questioned
God's plan for herself, but her parents assured her that with enough prayer
she could overcome her illness. She did not.
While Julie's story is a fictional account, Shannon's is not. Following
Shannon's death, her parents were tried and convicted of involuntary
manslaughter and endangering the welfare of a child. In their defense, they
argued that Shannon was a mature minor who made the decision to forego
medical treatment on her own.4
The so-called mature minor doctrine is based on a seemingly simple
principle: minors who demonstrate a sufficient level of maturity ought to
have their choices respected independent of third parties. It is well settled
that adults, i.e., those over the age of eighteen, are presumed competent and
therefore enjoy a certain level of autonomous decision-making free from
outside intrusion. Those who have not reached the age of majority, on the
other hand, are presumed incompetent, and thus require the aid of parents or
guardians to assist in the decision-making process.
Based on recent studies in adolescent development, various scholars have
argued that certain individuals, though not yet eighteen, have the requisite
competence to make informed, autonomous choices. Thus, the argument
goes, their decisions should be respected to the same degree as those who
have achieved the arbitrary age of majority.
Though many agree that certain adolescents reason on a level equal to that
of young adults, debate surrounds whether these findings support the
conclusion that minors should be permitted to consent to or refuse medical
treatment especially when the choice has life or death consequences. A
further complication exists when the decision is based upon religious beliefs.
To date, the main body of discourse has focused on one of two things: (1)
whether parents should be permitted to refuse medical treatment on behalf of
their children based upon religious objections, and (2) whether minors
should be permitted to prove a sufficient level of maturity to make medical
decisions for themselves. Though some courts and scholars have addressed
these topics in the same document, little attention has been paid to the
unique circumstances involved when both are implicated, as in the cases of
Julie and Shannon.5 Failing to address the religious integrity of the minors

4.

See infra Part IV (detailing the case of Shannon Nixon).

5. In all reported cases involving the refusal of medical treatment, the custodial
parents shared the same religious beliefs as the minors involved. See infra Part II
(discussing cases of custodial parents refusing medical treatment for their children on
religious grounds).
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in question creates the possibility that they will choose to die for beliefs that
are not truly their own.
This article will attempt to bridge the current divide. Part I will detail the
legal and ethical basis for the presumption that those under the age of
eighteen are incompetent to make autonomous decisions, particularly
medical decisions. Part II will then delineate those circumstances where
parental decisional rights concerning their minor children may be limited.
Part III explores situations where minors are empowered to make medical
decisions. This includes statutory exceptions for certain treatment, the
abortion context and the common law mature minor doctrine. Part IV
analyzes the pivotal cases involving both religious and medical decision
making by adolescents. The cases reach different results regarding the
mature minor doctrine in this context leaving the topic ripe for debate. Part
V will then outline the special concerns implicated by the religious
expression of adolescents and the extent to which this expression deserves
respect. It will deal particularly with defining and measuring religious
integrity in those situations where adolescents seek to refuse medical
treatment based upon religious beliefs.
This article will conclude that when adolescents attempt to refuse lifesaving or sustaining medical treatment based upon religious beliefs, they
have the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that they both
understand the medical aspects of the decision and have beliefs that are
central to their conception of well-being. Only then can practitioners
determine that the minor, independent of undue third party influence or
coercion, has the ability to make an autonomous decision to risk dying for
those beliefs.

I. PRESUMPTIONS: MINORS AND MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING

A. The Common Law Age of Majority and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment
In the eyes of the law, there is something magical about the stroke of
midnight on the eve of one's eighteenth birthday. It is at this point that
individuals are considered to become legally recognizable adults 6 with all
the rights--except perhaps drinking alcohol-that stem there from. Prior to
the passage of the last second of one's seventeenth year, individuals are
plagued with the assumption that they lack the "maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required to make life's difficult decisions." 7

6.

Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Adolescence, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV.

547, 558-59 (2000) (noting that various rights accrue at different ages, but the age of
majority is the baseline at which "presumptive adult legal status is attained").
7. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
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As early as the signing of the Magna Carta, the common law age of
Before this time individuals aged fourteen or
majority was twenty-one.
fifteen were commonly held to have adult status. For instance, under Roman
law, the test for adulthood was whether male students had "both
understanding and judgment9 as to acts in law;" this ability was presumed to
exist by the age of fourteen.
At some point during the ninth and tenth centuries in Northern Europe, the
age of majority was set at fifteen. Interestingly, this age was tied closely to
the ability to bear arms.' ° As armor became increasingly heavy and
burdensome in the middle of the thirteenth century, younger combatants
were unable to perform with enough skill to be effective. The introduction
of knights on horseback added another element of skill that fifteen-year-olds
During feudal times, younger males often became
rarely possessed."
squires with the hope that after sufficient training they would rise to the level
of knight after their twenty-first birthday; the age subsequently adopted
under the English common law when individuals became free to make
decisions without the aid of a guardian.12
The English brought this common law age of majority to the colonies
where it remained, and after the Revolution, came under the purview of the
United States. Until the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment, the states
retained the authority to set the ages at which to recognize rights of
the right most associated with being an active citizen is
citizens. 13 Perhaps
14
the right to vote.
The Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, passed
in 1971, lowered the age at which citizens have the right to vote in federal
and state elections from twenty-one to eighteen.' 5 This naturally begs the
question of why those under twenty-one were ever prevented from voting.
Was it really because those incapable of riding a horse into combat wearing
full armor are equally incapable of making intelligent political choices?
Although this sounds humorous, it was just the sort of question asked by
those challenging the fact that eighteen-year-olds were being sent into

8. T.E. James, The Age of Majority, 4 AM. J.LEGAL. HIST. 22, 26 (1960).
9. Id.at 25.
10. Id. at 24-26.
11. Id. at27.
12. Id. at 28-31.
13. See generally Scott, supra note 6 (discussing various state specific laws
regarding the ages at which rights accrue to citizens).
14. Id. at 562 (stating that the "right to vote has long been the defining marker of
legal adulthood").
15. The Amendment states: "[t]he right of citizens of the United States, who are
eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of age." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
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Vietnam,' 6 yet could not vote on the political decision to go to war in the
first place. The argument for setting a threshold age for voting rests on the
assumption that "education and an informed understanding of the issues are
important to 15olitical participation in a democracy, and that adults are more
likely to meet these criteria than children and adolescents"' 8 At this time, of
course, adulthood began at twenty-one.
Those in support of the amendment argued that the common law boundary
between adulthood and childhood did not reflect developmental reality.
They argued that psychological maturity is achieved by eighteen, 19 such that
the presumption of immaturity should not apply to those between eighteen
and twenty-one. The Senate committee that ultimately recommended the
enactment of the amendment was cognizant of this presumption, but also
acknowledged that "legal minors were treated as adults for the purposes of
criminal responsibility and punishment in all states,
and that many were
20
engaged in adult roles as employees and taxpayers."
The passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment changed the age of majority
from twenty-one to eighteen for most exercisable adult rights. Recent
scholarship in the healthcare setting, however, has challenged the notion that
eighteen is a proper guidepost for determining the onset of adulthood and the
concomitant right to make medical decisions.

B. The Ethics of MedicalDecision-Making
In the medical setting, there is a clear divide between the decision-making
capabilities of adults and minors. At the very core of this divide is the
presumption that adults are competent to make these decisions while minors
are not. 2 1 Minors are "assumed to lack sufficient cognitive and conative
maturity to craft autonomous health care choices, therefore being deemed
legally incapable of giving genuine informed consent to medical
treatment." 22 The United States Supreme Court has held that "most children,

16.

There is more than subtle irony in the fact that in over one thousand years of

human achievement the age of majority has been adjusted twice for war-motivated
reasons absent an intellectual inquiry into the developmental necessity of setting the age
as such.
17. See Scott, supra note 6, at 562-64.
18. Id. at 562.
19. S. REP.No. 92-26, at 5 (1971).
20. Scott, supra note 6, at 563.
21. Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy for Medical Care:
Physician Perceptionsand Practices, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 87, 88 (2001).
22. Martin T. Harvey, Adolescent Competency and the Refusal of Medical
Treatment, 13 HEALTH MATRiX 297, 299 (2003).
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even in adolescence, simply are not able to make sound judgments
concerning 23many decisions, including their need for medical care or
treatment.,
To understand why minors cannot be trusted to make health care decisions
for themselves, it is necessary to explore the concept of an autonomous
medical decision, and what some would argue prevents minors from
25
achieving this ideal. 24 Bioethics discourse, founded in medicine, law,
philosophy and religion, "asks difficult moral questions and provides
,926
Rather than
decision-makers with principles to guide them to answers.
starting with presumptions regarding age, a bioethical inquiry seeks to
justify why minors' decisions regarding medical care should or should not
be respected.
One of the founding principles of civilized society is that individuals
acting in a private capacity may not violate the bodily integrity of one
another without consent. 27 This principle extends to the health care setting,
requiring that physicians and other practitioners obtain consent from a
Justice Cardozo put it this
patient before performing medical procedures.
way, "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages.' 29 Although consent has been required for

23. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979).
24. Whether adults truly achieve this ideal is a matter beyond the scope of this
article.
25. See generally TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF

(5th ed. 2001) (detailing the four major principles in bioethics:
autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice).
BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

26. Jennifer L. Rosato, Using Bioethics Discourse to Determine when Parents
Should Make Health Care Decisions for Their Children: Is Deference Justified?, 73
TEMP. L. REv. 1, 29 (2000).
27. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, "no right is held more
sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or

interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law." Union Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891). See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §9, at 39-42 (5th ed. 1984).
28.

See generally RUTH R.

FADEN

& TOM L.

BEAUCHAMP,

A

HISTORY AND THEORY

114-25 (1986) (detailing the first reported case, Slater v. Baker,
95 Eng. Rep. 860 (K.B. 1767), of a physician being held liable for failure to obtain
consent when the physician performed an unorthodox procedure to correct a broken leg
although the patient only consented to standard treatment). See, e.g., Cruzan v. Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1989).
29. Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hospital, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
OF INFORMED CONSENT
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centuries, the concept
of informed consent has only existed since the mid30
twentieth century.
Historically, medical care was delivered with the paternalistic31
understanding that physicians knew what was best for their patients.
Physicians acted in accord with the principle of beneficence 32 by
"preventing harm, removing harm, and doing good. 3 3 This was best
accomplished when patients did what they were told.
From the late 1950s continuing through the early 1970s, scholars began to
suggest that patients be permitted to play a more active role in their medical
care. Jay Katz described the clash of these two approaches as follows:
The conflict created by uncertainties about the extent to which
individual and societal well-being is better served by encouraging
patients' self-determination or supporting physicians' paternalism
is the central problem of informed consent. This fundamental
conflict [reflects] a thorough-going ambivalence about human
beings' capacities for taking care of themselves and need for
caretaking.... 34
Rather than assuming that physicians know what is best for their patients,
the presumption became that "competent individuals are better judges of
their own good than are others" 35 and, as such, should be permitted to make
medical decisions for themselves. 36 The idea that individuals should be

30. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 28, at 125 (citing Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr.
Univ. Bd. of Tr., 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) as coining the phrase "informed

consent").
31. According to the Hippocratic Oath, physicians swear to "apply dietetic measures
for the benefit of the sick according to my ability and judgment; I will keep them from
harm and injustice." The Hippocratic Oath, translated in Ludwig Edelstein, The
Hippocratic Oath: Text, Translation And Interpretation, in ANCIENT MEDICINE: SELECTED
PAPERS OF LUDWIG EDELSTEIN 6 (Ousei Temkin & C. Lillian Temkin eds., 1967).
Certain scholars view this language as "secretive, sexist, paternalistic, and elitist." JURIT
BERGSMA & DAVID C. THOMASMA, AUTONOMY AND CLINICAL MEDICINE 123 (2000).

32. The principle of beneficence refers to a moral obligation to act for the benefit of
others. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 165-24.
33.

EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C. THOMASMA, THE VIRTUES IN MEDICAL

PRACTICE 53 (1993).

34.

See FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 28, at 125-27.

35.

ALLEN E. BUCHANAN & DAN W. BROCK, DECIDING FOR OTHERS: THE ETHICS OF

SURROGATE DECISION MAKING 29 (1989).

36.

This is an acknowledgment that from the patient's perspective, health is only one

of many values given consideration. Id. at 30.

Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law and Policy [Vol. XXII:233

242

respected 37 in their self-determination is encapsulated by the bioethical
principle of respect for autonomy.
From the Greek autos (self) and nomos (rule or law) "personal autonomy
has come to refer to personal self-governance; personal rule of the self by
interferences
adequate understanding while remaining
. .. free from controlling
,,38"
That persons
that
prevent
choice.
by others and from personal limitations
are autonomous is "rooted in the liberal Western tradition" that emphasizes
the "importance of individual freedom and choice, both for political life and
for personal development." 39 Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma
refer to a "fundamental and universal moral truth... that humans are owed
reasoned choices that are their own and that
respect for their ability to make
40
share.",
not
may
or
may
others
Yet, individuals do not develop personal identities in a vacuum. Indeed,
persons are "socially embedded" and form identities "within the context ' of
4
1
social relationships" and a complex intersection of "social determinants.
It is not necessary that a person make decisions completely free from
influence; rather, autonomous individuals act "freely in accordance with a
self-chosen plan." 42 In other words, their decisions are not controlled by
third parties, but are governed by a self-conception developed over time in
43
relation to cultural and social experiences.
The principle that one deserves respect as an autonomous person is
different than whether that person's decisions should be respected as
autonomous. For instance, "[a]utonomous persons can and do make nonautonomous choices" in the presence of "temporary constraints such as
ignorance or coercion. 44 Informed consent is founded on the idea that if
you give competent individuals sufficient information, absent coercion, they
will use that information to make an autonomous decision "that they believe

37.

Respect for persons used throughout this article stems from the Kantian

categorical imperative: "act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as
a means."

IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 429 (James

W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 3d ed. 1981) (1785).
38.

FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 28, at 8.

39.

Id. at 7.

40.

PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supranote 33, at 21.

41.

BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 61 (internal quotations omitted).

42.

Id. at 58.

43.

Beauchamp and Childress emphasize that choices must be voluntary, that is,

absent controlling influences such as coercion or undue manipulation. Id. at 93-95.
Certain forms of persuasion are permissible to the extent that they appeal to the
individual's reason. Id. at 94.
44. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 28, at 8.
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will best promote their own well-being as they conceive it.'4 5 The analytical
elements of informed consent are: (1) disclosure, (2) comprehension, (3)
voluntariness, (4) competence, 46 and (5) some decisional action.47
As the doctrine of informed consent became entrenched in the law,
disproportionate emphasis was placed on disclosure. Physicians were given
the duty to provide certain information if they wished to avoid liability for
failure to obtain informed consent.48 Generally speaking, legal disclosure
consists of four categories of information: (1) diagnosis, including the
"medical steps preceding diagnosis"; (2) the "[n]ature and purpose of the
proposed treatment" with likelihood of success; (3) the probability and
severity of risk associated with the treatment in question; and (4) feasible

alternatives-including

nontreatment--coupled

with

their

risks,

49

consequences, and probabilities of success.
While disclosure is an
important element of informed consent, ethically speaking, it is not the most

essential.5 °
For instance, although competence is the fourth element listed, it is really
the threshold question. 51 After all, if a particular patient is deemed
incompetent, it is not necessary to provide him or her with information;
rather, the information must be provided to a proper surrogate decisionmaker.52 What then does it mean to be competent to make medical
decisions?
Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock suggest that there are three capacities
necessary for decision-making competence: capacities for communication
and understanding of information, capacities for reasoning and deliberation,

45. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 30.
46. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 28, at 274.
47. There is some debate as to how to label the last element. Faden and Beauchamp
use "consent," but note that others prefer "decision," "shared decisionmaking [sic] or
collaboration." Id. at 274-75. All would agree that some "action," be it consent or
refusal, is required.
48. Id. at 276.
49.

BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 356-57 (4th ed. 2001).

50. FADEN & BEAUCHAMP, supra note 28, at 276. The authors suggest that there is
"nothing about the nature of an informed consent per se that requires disclosure as a
necessary condition, and certainly nothing that would orient its meaning around
disclosure." Id. (emphasis in original). The authors make a distinction between true
informed consent, known as autonomous authorization, and merely effective informed
consent that meets legal or institutional guidelines. Id. at 280.
51. See id. at 287-88 (referring to competence as the "gatekeeping concept"). Only
competent persons are capable of autonomous authorization. Id.
52. See generally BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35 (discussing both the
importance of selecting a proper surrogate and once the surrogate is chosen, how
decisions should be made regarding the incompetent individual).
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and capacities to have and apply a set of values. 53 These capacities are
necessary to ensure that the individual's choice is truly in line with his or her
conception of well-being, 54 and thus, deserving of respect as autonomous.
Persons can be deemed incompetent, and thus, have their decisions set aside,
where an inquiry indicates that they are "mistaken about what will. . . best
satisfy their underlying and enduring aims and values," and/or they "fail to
in accord with objective ideals of the person and personal
accept or choose
55
well-being."
Recall, however, that adults are presumed to have this capacity, and a full
blown inquiry into an adult's competence will only be triggered by peculiar
circumstances that indicate to a health care professional that the adult's
56
In practice, therefore, unless clear and
competence should be questioned.
convincing evidence is supplied to the contrary, adults possess "[a]n
unqualified liberty interest... to [consent to or] refuse any and all medical
treatments. 57 Those under the age of eighteen, on the other hand, are
presumed to lack capacity sufficient to rise to the level of competence
requisite for autonomous authorization.
Returning to the capacities suggested by Buchanan and Brock, there is a
real question, and limited empirical data, regarding the ability of minors to
understand and communicate about the semantic content of treatment
discussions. 58 While it may be unnecessary for patients to truly grasp the
technical medical data, it is essential that they understand the "impact that

53. Id. at 23-25.
54. Defining an individual's conception of well-being, or what is good, is
philosophically complex. Buchanan and Brock summarize three theories of well-being:
1)"[h]edonist theories hold that the only thing that is good for a person is having
conscious experiences of a specified, positive sort"; 2) preference or desire satisfaction,
which holds that "what is good for persons is for them to have their desires or preferences
satisfied to the maximum extent possible over their lifetimes"; and 3) objective list or
ideal theory, which denies that "happiness and preference satisfaction are all there is to
personal well-being." BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 30-34.
55. Id. at 34-35.
56. Buchanan and Brock suggest that this presumption is supported by the values of
individual well-being and self-determination: they state "first, that a person's important
interest in making significant decisions about his or her life, specifically about health
care, provides strong support for this general presumption and, second, that adults' health
care decisions are in the large majority of cases reasonably in accord with their wellbeing." Id at 22. A patient's refusal of a physician's recommended course of treatment
may give rise to an inquiry, but is not itself evidence of incompetence. Id.at 58.
57. Harvey, supra note 22, at 303.
58. Id. at 219 (citing Thomas Grisso & Linda Vierling, Minors' Consent to
Treatment: A Developmental Perspective,9 PROF. PSYCHOL. 412 (1978)).
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treatment alternatives will have on their lives. 59 Some argue that because
minors have limited 60life experience, their decisions are "not part of a wellconceived life plan."
Importantly, minors "may give inadequate weight to the effects of
decisions on their future interests, and also fail to anticipate future changes
in their values that may be predictable by others.'
Minors tend to place
greater emphasis on the present effects of a decision than long-term
consequences, 62 are more susceptible to peer pressure, 63 and studies have
shown 64that minors participate in unhealthy risk-taking more often than do
adults.
Taken together, these claims lend themselves to the notion that minors
"need a protected period in which to develop 'enabling virtues' (habits,
including the habit of self control), which advance their lifetime autonomy
and opportunities. ' 65 In other words, minors need time to develop a true
conception of well-being that would be reflected in a competent decision
deserving respect as autonomous. As Elizabeth Scott has observed, "this
account of childhood leads quite naturally to the conclusion that children
must be subject to adult authority, and that the deeply ingrained political
values 66of autonomy, responsibility, and liberty simply do not apply to
,
them."
Because minors cannot consent to treatment themselves, the general rule
is that physicians must obtain consent from the minors' parents before
rendering care. 67 In fact, except in medical emergencies, physicians are
liable of the tort of battery where they perform medical procedures on
minors without first obtaining parental consent.68 The rationale for requiring

59. Id.
60. See LAINIE

FRIEDMAN Ross, CHILDREN, FAMILIES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION-

MAKING 61 (1998).
61. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 221.
62. Ann Eileen Driggs, Note, The Mature Minor Doctrine: Do Adolescents Have the
Right to Die?, 11 HEALTH MATRIX 687, 704 (2001).
63. Jennifer L. Rosato, The End of Adolescence: Let's Get Real: Quilting a
PrincipledApproach to Adolescent Empowerment in Health Care Decision-Making, 51
DEPAUL L. REv. 769, 786 (2002).
64.

LYNN E. PONTON, THE ROMANCE OF RISK: WHY TEENAGERS DO THE THINGS THEY

Do 1 (1997).
65. Ross, supra note 60, at 61.
66. Scott, supra note 6, at 551. For an in depth analysis of whether this account
should apply to adolescent decision-making, see infra Part IV.
67. See, e.g., Rosato, The End of Adolescence, supra note 63, at 771. Among the
exceptions to this rule are emergency situations where consent is presumed to exist.
Driggs, supra note 62, at 691.
68. Scott, supra note 6, at 566.
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parental consent is founded on two deeply rooted principles: (1) that minors
need to be protected from the dangers of uninformed, immature decisions;
and (2) who better to decide
for children than parents who are presumed to
69
act in their best interests.

II WHY WE ALLOW PARENTS TO DECIDE AND WHEN WE Do NOT
Parents have a fundamental right, protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, 70 to raise their children as they see fit. 7 1 This
right, grounded in both law and ethics, extends to inculcating religious
values and making medical decisions73 for their incompetent children. In
Parham v. JR., the United States Supreme Court stated:
The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that
parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and
capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult
decisions. More important, historically it has been recognized that
natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of
their children.74

69.
70.

Rosato, The End of Adolescence, supra note 63, at 771-72.

The Fourteenth Amendment states, in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
71. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401 (1923); Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
72. See Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53, 54
(1999) (stating that "controlling religious upbringing is considered one of the core aspects
of parenting").
73. See, e.g., Rosato, Using Bioethics, supra note 26 (arguing that although parents
should retain their primary decision-making status, the current state of the law should be
reconsidered for situations where parents and children have conflicting interests).
74. 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979). Under the best interest principle, the surrogate
chooses "that which will maximally promote the patient's good" which entails trying to
"determine the net benefits to the patient of each option." BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra
note 35, at 94. Compare this to the substituted judgment principle whereby the surrogate
chooses "as the patient would choose if the patient were competent and aware both of the
medical options and of the facts about his or her condition, including the fact that he or
she is incompetent." Id.
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Buchanan and Brock offer four reasons in support of the position
that
75
parents are the proper surrogate decision-makers for their children:
[First b]ecause in most cases parents both care deeply about the
welfare of their children and know them and their needs better
than others do, they will be more concerned as well as better able
than anyone else to ensure that the decisions made will serve their
children's welfare....
[Second] parents must bear the consequences of treatment choices
for their dependent children and so should have at least some
control of those choices....
[Third] a right of parents, at least, within limits, [is] to raise their
children according to the parents' own standards and values and to
seek to transmit those standards and values to their children....
[Fourth] the family is a valuable social institution, in particular its
role in fostering intimacy. . . The family must have some
significant freedom from oversight, control, and intrusion to
achieve intimacy .... 76
Additionally, Lainie Friedman Ross argues that the intimate family is itself
autonomous, and as such, "promotes the interests and goals of both the
children and the parents." 77 She suggests that parents are in the best place to
understand familial goals, and therefore, should
retain final decision-making
78
authority in continual pursuit of those goals.
This being said, parents generally enjoy the right to make decisions on
behalf of their children without state interference. The Supreme Court has
stated that "[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the
child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder., 79 In
fact, intervention is only justifiable where the state demonstrates "a powerful
countervailing interest."

75.

BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note

35, at

233-34; see also Ross, supra note 60, at

39-41.
76.

BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 233-34.

77.

Ross, supra note 60, at 62.

78. Id. Ross's beliefs are supported by work done by Ferdinand Schoeman who
stated that "the family is to be thought of as an intimate arrangement with its own goals
and purposes." BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 236.
79. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (citing Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)). The right was recently reiterated by the Court in Troxel v.

Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65-66 (2000).
80.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972).
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The State of Massachusetts was successful in raising such an interest in
the case of Prince v. Massachusetts.81 Prince involved the conviction of a
nine-year-old girl's custodial aunt for violation of the Massachusetts child
labor laws. 82 The aunt, a member of the Jehovah's Witness Church, took her
niece with her as she traveled throughout her neighborhood distributing
religious materials.8 3 By the time the case reached the United States
Supreme Court it was uncontested that this activity violated state statute.
Rather, the Court granted certiorari to determine whether the statute itself
was constitutional as construed and applied in this context. 84 The aunt
85
argued that it violated her First Amendment right to freedom of religion,
and her parental
rights secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
86
Amendment.
The Supreme Court presented the conflict as the "obviously earnest claim
for freedom of conscience and religious practice," coupled with the "parent's
claim to authority in her own household and in the rearing of her children,"
against the "interests of society to protect the welfare of children, and the
state's assertion of authority to that end.' 87 Although the Court
acknowledged the strength of the former,88it made clear that neither religious
nor parental rights are beyond limitation.
89
The Court concluded that the State, as parens patriae,
has a "wide range
of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in things affecting the
child's welfare; and that this includes, to some extent, matters of conscience
and religious conviction." 90 After describing the potential dangers of street
propagandizing, the Court delivered one of its most oft quoted statements:
"Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their children

81.

321 U.S. 158 (1944).

82.

Id.at 159-60.

83. The two also stood in stationary locations holding up signs offering the material
for five cents per copy. Id. at 161-62.
84. Interestingly, both sides agreed that the statute was valid to the extent of secular
application. Id. at 164.
85. The aunt relied on what is generally known as the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend I.
86. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164 (1944).
87. Id. at 165.
88. Id. at 166.
89. Literally meaning "parent of his or her country."
1144 (8th ed. 2004).

90.

Prince, 321 U.S. at 167.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
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before they have reached the age 9of full and legal discretion when they can
make that choice for themselves." '
The Supreme Court reached a seemingly contrary result in the case of
Wisconsin v. Yoder,92 where three sets of Amish parents were convicted at
trial of violating the State's compulsory education law. 93 The statute in
question required children to attend private or public school until the age of
95
sixteen, 94 but the parents acting in accordance with their religious beliefs,
withdrew their children after they completed eighth grade. 96 The parents did
not challenge the fact that their actions violated the statute; rather, they
argued that the 97
statute unconstitutionally infringed upon their First
Amendment rights.
The trial and appellate courts agreed that the compulsory education law
interfered with the freedom of the parents to act in accordance with their
religious beliefs, but concluded that the State's interest in education made
enactment of the statute a "reasonable and constitutional" exercise of
government power. 98 Wisconsin's Supreme Court, on the other hand,
99
asserted that this interest was not sufficient to override the parents' rights.
It therefore reversed the convictions holding that the compulsory education
law violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 100 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court began by noting that although the State's interest in universal
education is strong, 1° 1 it is not "totally free from a balancing process when it
impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the

91.
92.

Id.at 170.
406 U.S. 205 (1972). The reasoning in both Prince and Yoder was consistent, but

the results varied due in large part to the different evidentiary records presented. See
Prince, 321 U.S. at 161-63; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207-13.
93.

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.

94.

WIs. STAT. § 118.15(l)(a) (1969).

95. The parents feared that by sending their children to high school they "would not
only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church community, but, as
found by the county court, also endanger their own salvation and that of their children."
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 209.
96.

Id.at 207.

97. The parents presented expert evidence regarding the impact compulsory
education could have on the "continued survival of Amish community" considering their
"fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart
from the world and worldly influence." Id.at 210.
98.

Id.at213.

99.

Id.

100.

Id.

101.

See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
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traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their
children."' 0 2 The Court found that the Amish way of life was protected
under the First Amendment because their tradition is "one of deep religious
conviction,
shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily
03
living."'
In this case, the Court determined that forcing Amish children to attend
high school would expose them to "worldly influences in terms of attitudes,
goals, and values contrary to beliefs" in contravention of "the basic religious
tenets and practice of the Amish faith." 1°4 It determined that to do so,
especially during the crucial developmental stage of adolescence, would
interfere with "the religious development of the Amish child and his
integration into the way of life of the Amish faith community."' 1 5 In finding
the Wisconsin statute unconstitutional, the Court concluded that
"enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education
after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise
of respondents' religious beliefs."
The majority's analysis in Yoder was framed as a conflict between the
Amish parents and the State.' 0 7 The Court specifically noted that the parents
were charged under the Wisconsin statute, and therefore "their right[s] of
free exercise, not that of their children," were at stake. ° 8 The State did not
argue that the parents were preventing their children from attending high
school against the expressed wishes of the children. Thus, the Supreme
Court did not10 address
situations involving conflicts between parents and
9
their children.

102.

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1971).

103.

Id. at 216.

104.

Id. at 218.

105.
106.

Id.
Id. at 219.

The State attempted to argue that while Amish beliefs are

unquestionably protected under the First Amendment, religious action or conduct is
frequently regulated under the State's police power. Id. at 220. The Court noted,
however, that although the parents were charged for the action of removing their children
from school, the Amish way of life is inseparable from their beliefs, and thus, still under
the purview of the First Amendment. Id.at 215-17, 220. Because of the First
Amendment protection, the Supreme Court utilized strict scrutiny to conclude that
Wisconsin had not presented a sufficiently compelling state interest.
107. Buss, supra note 72, at 56.
108. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230-31.
109. Id. at 231. In a partial dissent, however, Justice Douglas indicated that the
children's rights and interests were at stake, and should have been given more
consideration. Id. at 241-42 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part). For a detailed discussion of
the Douglas dissent see infra Part III.
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Although the Court was careful to limit its decision in the education
setting to the specific facts before it," 0 the Yoder decision is important

because it signifies the strength of a parent's First Amendment right to foster
the religious development of their children. The majority opinion rejected
the State's reliance on Prince stating that there was no demonstration of
"any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public

safety, peace, order, or welfare.""'
In the years between Prince and Yoder, state courts were substantially on
their own in determining when to intervene when parents made medical

decisions on behalf of their children based upon religious beliefs."12 Prior to
Prince, courts utilized a "life threatening exception" that typically involved
state intervention in situations where medical care would "obviate almost
certain death for a minor whose parents refused to consent to a blood
transfusion."' 13 In cases where the child's life was not in imminent risk,

however, courts were hesitant to override parental objections to medical
care.

114

Thus, debate surrounded the issue of when children are placed in

risk sufficient to rise to the level of Prince-like martyrdom."15
In the early 1970s, two cases emerged addressing the varying judicial

attitudes about the state's role in protecting children "in situations that might
fit within a category soon to be labeled 'medical neglect.""' 6 The first, In re
Sampson, involved neglect proceedings brought against the mother of a

fifteen-year-old boy (Kevin) who suffered from neurofibromatosis."

7

The

110. See Walter Wadlington, Medical Decision Makingfor and by Children: Tensions
Between Parent, State, and Child, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 311, 320 n.46 (1994).
111. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230.
112. Wadlington, supra note 110, at 317 (referring to a case in 1968, where, in a one
sentence opinion citing to Prince, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
Washington State statute authorizing courts to order blood transfusions for minor
children over the objection of their parents. Jehovah's Witness v. King County Hosp.
Unit No. 1, 390 U.S. 598 (1968)).
113. Wadlington, supra note 110, at 315.
114. Id. at 316-18 (detailing two cases at the outer limits of the "life threatening
exception." In one case the court declined to order a recommended arm amputation of a
young girl over the objection of the mother. The mother did not have a religious
objection, but feared the surgery was too risky. In re Hudson, 126 P.2d 765 (Wash.
1942). The other case involved a father who refused to consent to a surgery that would
have corrected his son's cleft palate and harelip. The court honored the father's
objection, which was based on his own philosophical belief in mental healing, as opposed
to organized religious beliefs. In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820 (N.Y. 1955)).
115. Wadlington, supra note 110, at 313-14.
116. Idat319.
The disease, also known as von
117. 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 643 (N.Y. 1970).
Recklinghausen's, caused the boy to have "a large fold or flap of an overgrowth of facial
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mother consented to a risky surgical procedure aimed at correcting her son's
facial deformity, but refused to consent to the administration of any blood
transfusions."
As a member of the Jehovah's Witness faith, she believed
that blood transfusions would violate the biblical prohibition against the
consumption of blood.11 9
Although the court noted that Kevin's condition posed no immediate
12
threat to his life, nor had it seriously affected his general physical health, 0
it felt that corrective surgery offered him a chance for a "normal, happy
existence," that would "unquestionably be impossible if the disfigurement
[was] not corrected." 121 In ordering the mother to permit Kevin to undergo
the surgery, the court concluded that she was neglectful due to her refusal to
give consent for "the surgical procedures necessary to insure the physical,
mental and emotional well being of her son.' 22 The record did not reveal
whether Kevin's wishes were ascertained, implying that the State's
conclusion about what would serve Kevin's best interests was controlling.
In the second case, In re Green, neglect proceedings were brought against
the custodial mother of a fifteen-year-old boy (Ricky) who suffered from

tissue which causes the whole cheek, the corner of his mouth and right ear to drop down
giving him an appearance which can only be described as grotesque and repulsive." Id.
118. Id. The physician planning to perform the procedure testified as to its high
degree of risk even if the blood transfusions were authorized. The surgical team refused
to operate in the absence of transfusions. Id. at 645.
119. Jehovah's Witnesses point to several biblical passages in support of their belief.

See

THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESS TRADITION: RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND HEALTH CARE
DEciSIONS (Edwin R. Dubose et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter THE JEHOVAH'S WITNESS

For instance, when the flood subsided Noah was told "[e]very living thing
that moves will be yours to eat, no less than the foliage of the plants. I give you
everything, with this exception: you must not eat flesh with life, that is to say blood, in
it."
Genesis 9:3-4. Similarly, under the Levitican Laws of Holiness, the Israelites were
warned, "If any member of the House of Israel... consumes blood of any kind, I shall set
my face against that individual who consumes blood and shall outlaw him from his
people. For the life of the creature is in the blood... for blood is what expiates for a
life." Leviticus 17:10-11.
The Deuteronomic Code further advises, "[t]ake care,
however, not to eat the blood, since blood is life, and you must not eat the life with the
meat." Deuteronomy 12:23. Finally, in the New Testament, a passage states that one of
the few burdens placed on the early Christians was to "abstain from food sacrificed to
idols, from blood ..." Acts 15:29.
120. In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
121. ld. at657.
122. Id. at 658-59. In affirming the decision, the New York Court of Appeals noted
that its previous holding in Seiforth was not intended to limit the power of courts to direct
surgery solely in those circumstances involving "risk to the physical health or life of the
subject or to the public." In re Sampson, 278 N.E.2d 918 (N.Y. 1972) (per curiam).
TRADITION].
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Ricky's mother consented to risky surgery aimed at
paralytic scoliosis.
correcting his spinal curvature, but as a Jehovah's Witness, she
refused to
S 124
allow blood transfusions to be administered during the procedure.
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the question before it was
whether "the State [has] an interest of sufficient magnitude to warrant the
abridgment of a parent's right to freely practice his or her religion when
those beliefs preclude medical treatment of a son or daughter whose life is
not in immediate danger. . ...12 The court acknowledged that Ricky's
condition was "unfortunate," but held that the State does not have a
sufficient interest to interfere with a parent's religious beliefs126unless the
child's life is "immediately imperiled by his physical condition."'
The court then took an unusual step. Taking a clue from the Douglas
dissent in Yoder-stating that the rights and interests of children warrant
more consideration-it remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on
Ricky's wishes.' 27 The court stated that the record did not even note
whether Ricky was a Jehovah's Witness or planned to become one.128 On
remand, Ricky indicated that he did not wish to submit to the surgery, at
least in part, because he had been in and out of the hospital and "no one had
told him that 'it is going to come out right.""' 29 Because Ricky and his
mother ended up agreeing that he not undergo surgery, the court never
addressed how it would handle a situation where the child disagreed with his
or her parents.
Although the courts in Sampson and Green had similar facts before them,
they came to very different results. While Green furthered the "lifethreatening exception" to parental control, Sampson at least implicitly
suggested that the child's quality of life is a relevant consideration, and can
justify state intervention as an additional exception.
The aforementioned cases exemplify the complexity of trying to
determine when parents are permitted to make medical decisions for their

123. 292 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. 1972). Ricky's condition involved a 94% curvature of
his spine that would ultimately render him bedridden. Id.
124.

Id.

125.

Id.at 390.

Id. at 392. The court expressly disagreed with the holding in Sampson that
religious objections to blood transfusions are not a bar where the transfusions are
necessary for the success of the required surgery. Specifically, the Pennsylvania court
was hesitant to call any surgery "required" where the life of the patient is not at stake. Id.
at 391-92.
127. Id. at 392.
128. Id.
129. Wadlington, supra note 110, at 321 n. 52 (citing In re Green, 307 A.2d 279, 280
126.

(Pa. 1973)).
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children, especially when those decisions involve religious beliefs. 130 In
general, parents enjoy the right to raise their children as they see fit without
undue interference by the state. This includes both fostering religious
development and making medical decisions, but does not extend to decisions
that put their children's lives at risk.
With the exception of Green, these cases generally address conflicts
between the rights and preferences of the parents and those of the state,
without consideration of the preferences of the children. Where parents are
found to make decisions that do not appear to further the well-being of their
children by placing their lives at risk, the state intervenes. Further, the cases
rest on the assumption that the minors in question are in need of, and
require, protection either from their parents or the state when their rights are
at stake. Returning to the ethical discussion from Part I, the presumption is
that either the parent or the state is in a better position than the child to
promote the child's well-being. While this may be true for younger minors,
recent scholarship has challenged the notion that older minors, namely
adolescents, should be treated identically.

III. RIGHTS OF MINORS: STATUTORY EXCEPTIONS, ABORTION & THE

MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE
Minors do possess rights protected by the Constitution. The Supreme
Court has noted that "neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of
Rights is for adults alone."' 13 1 Further, although recognizing the importance
of the age of majority, the Court has stated that "[c]onstitutional rights do
not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the statedefined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights."' 32 It is clear, however, that
these rights are much more limited than those of adults.1 33 What is less clear
is the extent to which the rights of minors, when recognized, are

130.

When religious beliefs are involved, the parents may argue under both the First

and Fourteenth Amendments, thus bolstering their claims against state intervention.
131. InreGault, 387 U.S. 1,13(1967).

132. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
133. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633-35 (1979) (stating that "the constitutional
rights of children cannot be equated with those of adults," because of "the particular
vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical decisions in an informed, mature
manner; and the importance of the parental role in child rearing"). See also Scott, supra
note 6, at 552-53 (discussing the ability of states to restrict children's access to obscene
material, censorship in school newspapers, curfew ordinances, and other limitations that
would be unconstitutional as applied to adults).
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distinguishable from those of their parents. 134 The following discusses those
situations where minors are afforded rights independent of their parents.

A. Statutory Exceptions
Statutory exceptions to the general rule that minors cannot make decisions
for themselves commonly fall into one of two categories: (1) status
exceptions and (2) treatment exceptions.' 35 Status exceptions serve to
emancipate minors for the purpose of medical decision-making. In other
words, legal autonomy is extended to certain older minors "based on their
individual or social circumstances."' 136 Rhonda Gay Hartman indicates that
these circumstances typically include "a minor who is homeless, married or
divorced, has borne a child, is pregnant or has been pregnant, has graduated
from high school, 137
is living separately and independently, or is a member of
the armed forces."'

In some states, emancipated minors are extended decision-making
capacity beyond the health care setting. 38 In this sense, emancipation is
designed "to be a way to legitimize a minor's independence and ability to
make decisions before they [reach] age eighteen."' 3 Emancipation statutes
provide formal procedures as well as the criteria necessary for a finding of
emancipation,
but some argue that determinations of emancipation
primarily consider "financial independence as a measure
of the maturity that
141
an adult possesses to make major life decisions."'

134. See Buss, supra note 72, at 59; Matt Steinberg, Note, Free Exercise of Religion:
The Conflict Between a Parent's Rights and a Minor Child's Right in Determining the
Religion of the Child, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 219, 219-20 (1995). See also Joel
Feinberg, The Child's Right to an Open Future, in WHOSE CHILD? CHILDREN'S RIGHTS,
PARENTAL AUTHORITY, AND STATE POWER 125 (William Aiken & Hugh LaFollette, eds.,
1980) (describing four distinguishable rights of children and adults (1) rights children and
adults have in common-right to life; (2) rights possessed only by children-such as the
right to have food and shelter provided for them; (3) rights only extended to adults-like
making most legally binding decisions; and (4) rights in trust, or rights saved for the child
until adulthood).
135. A few states have also adopted mature minor statutes. See infra Part IIt.C.
136.

Rhonda Gay Hartman, Coming of Age: Devising Legislation for Adolescent

Decision-Making,28 AM. J. L. & MED. 409, 421 (2002).
137. Id. at 421-22 (detailing various state emancipation statutes).
138. ld.at 422.
139. Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: EmancipatingChildren in
Modern Times, 25 U. MICH. J.L. 239, 259-60 (1992).
140. Wadlington, supra note 110, at 323.
141. See Rosato, The End of Adolescence, supra note 63, at 777.
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Importantly, status exceptions have little to do with the actual decisionmaking capacity of the emancipated minors. 42 For instance, one could
argue that adolescents who get married or become pregnant show a level of
immaturity in decision-making. Jennifer Rosato suggests that "these
exceptions appear to exist because of an ease of application and
a need for
' 43
consistency, rather than a recognition of the minor's autonomy."'
The second type of statutory exception allows minors to consent to
specific types of treatment. 144 Most states permit minors to consent to
treatment for venereal diseases as well as access to contraception, drug or
alcohol dependency, mental health problems 145 or sexual abuse 146 without
involving their parents.
Like the emancipation statutes, there is no indication that the treatment
exceptions are founded on consideration of the minors' actual decisionmaking capabilities. Elizabeth Scott contends that "[n]o one argues that
minors should be deemed adults because they are particularly mature in
making decisions in these treatment contexts. Rather, the focus is on the
harm of requiring parental consent." 147 For example, a young girl may be
afraid to tell her mother that she is being sexually abused by her father, and
therefore will go untreated. In this sense, the treatment exceptions seem to
be an extension of the state's parens partriaeauthority; however, rather than
the state stepping in, it gives decision-making authority directly to minors.
Another policy behind the treatment exceptions stems from public health
and safety. Adolescents may be hesitant to inform their parents of their
sexual activity or substance abuse problems, and therefore will forego
medical treatment. Allowing minors to consent to these treatments without
involving their parents removes a substantial obstacle. As Scott points out,
"society also has an interest in reducing the incidence of sexually transmitted
diseases, substance abuse, mental illness, and teenage pregnancy. Together,
these social benefits largely explain why lawmakers shift the boundary of
childhood for the purpose of encouraging treatment of these conditions.

142.

Hartman, Coming ofAge, supra note 136, at 422.

143.

Rosato, The End ofAdolescence, supranote 63, at 777.

144.

Id. at 778.

145.

See Hartman, Coming ofAge, supra note 136, at 416-20.

146.

Rosato, The End ofAdolescence, supra note 63, at 778.

147. Scott, supra note 6, at 568.
148. Id. See also Jessica A. Penkower, Comment, The PotentialRight of Chronically
Ill Adolescents to Refuse Life-Saving Medical Treatment-Fatal Misuse of the Mature
Minor Doctrine,45 DEPAUL L. REV. 1165, 1177-78 (1996).
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B. Abortion
In the years following Roe v. Wade, 149 the Supreme Court was asked to
address the extent to which states may regulate adolescent access to
abortion. 50 Discussions about adolescent abortion entail a balancing of
interests: the adolescent's right to choose to have an abortion versus the
parental right to make important decisions on behalf of their children.
The Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Planned Parenthoodv.
Danforth, where one of the provisions of a Missouri abortion statute
required minors to obtain consent from at least one parent before obtaining
an abortion. 151 In striking down the provision, the Court determined that the
State's interest in safeguarding the family unit and parental authority is not
"sufficient justification" to "condition[ ] a [minor's] abortion on the consent
of a parent or person in loco parentis... ,152 The Court stated that "[a]ny
independent interest the parent may have in the termination of the minor
daughter's pregnancy is no more weighty than the right of
' 53 privacy of the
competent minor mature enough to have become pregnant."'
Three years later, the Court heard arguments in the case of Bellotti v.
Baird, involving a Massachusetts abortion statute that required minors to
obtain parental consent for an abortion, or if the parents refused, judicial
approval. 154 The Court began by noting that "legal restrictions on minors,
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to the
child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding."' 155 It went on,
however, to state that the "need to preserve the constitutional right and the
unique nature of the abortion decision, especially when made by a minor,
require a State to act with particular' 56sensitivity when it legislates to foster
parental involvement in this matter."'

149. 410 U.S. 113 (1979).
150. Rosato, Using Bioethics, supra note 26, at 16-19; Scott, supra note 6, at 569-76.
151. 428 U.S. 52, 58 (1976).
152. Id. at 75.
153. Id.
154. Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 625 (1979). The case was initially brought only
on behalf of minors "'who have adequate capacity to give a valid and informed consent
[to abortion], and who do not wish to involve their parents,"' but it later included the
rights of all pregnant minors. Id. at 626-27 (alteration in original) (quoting Baird v.
Bellotti, 393 F. Supp. 847, 850 (D. Mass. 1975)).
155. Belloi, 443 U.S. at 638-39.
156. Id. at 642. The Court was cognizant of the fact that other limitations on minors'
rights constitute delays, for example the right to drive or vote, whereas the nature of
pregnancy precludes delay. Id.
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In light of the special nature of pregnancy and abortion decisions, the
Court concluded that if states require parental consent as a condition for
minors seeking abortions they must also "provide an alternative procedure
whereby authorization for the abortion can be obtained."' 157 To this end, the
Court held that:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either:
(1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make
her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician,
independently of her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not
able to make this decision independently,
the desired abortion
58
would be in her best interests.'
The Court ultimately struck down the Massachusetts statute, holding that
the
159
judicial authorization it provided did not meet constitutional standards.
During the next two decades, the Supreme Court heard a number of cases
involving legislation aimed at regulating adolescent abortion. Specifically,
the cases dealt with the level of involvement parents should have in their
adolescent daughter's decision to have an abortion. 16 Starting with Bellotti,
however, the Court made clear that adolescent girls must be given an
opportunity, through judicial bypass, to establish that they are "mature and
well enough informed to make intelligently the abortion decision on [their]
own. ' 6 1 Though the Court did not provide an excessive amount of guidance

157.

Id. at643.

158. Id. at 643-44.
The Court further held that "every minor must have the
opportunity-if she so desires-to go directly to a court without first consulting or
notifying her parents," but the court maintains the right to require parental consultation if
it determines that it would be in the minor's best interests. Id. at 647.
159.

Id. at 645.

160.

See Lambert

v.

Wicklund,

520

U.S.

292,

293

(1997)

(upholding

the

constitutionality of a state statute requiring parental notification, but allowing the minor
to bypass a parental refusal through judicial procedure); Planned Parenthood of So. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 839 (1992) (upholding a statute requiring parental consent, with a
provision for judicial bypass); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 51920 (1990) (upholding a statute requiring parental consent or notification, with a judicial
bypass procedure); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423, 455, 497 (1990)

(upholding a statute requiring notice to both parents, with judicial bypass); City of Akron
v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 440-42 (1983) (the Court struck
down a city ordinance requiring parental consent without providing an adequate bypass
procedure); Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476,
490-94 (1983) (upholding statute requiring consent from at least one parent, with judicial
bypass); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981) (upholding a parental notice
requirement as applied to an immature, dependent minor).
161. Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 647.
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the principle was set: pregnant adolescents
in maturity determinations,
adjudged to have sufficient maturity must have their decision to have an
abortion respected.
The Supreme Court has not extended this opportunity to minors outside
the abortion context.1 63 Whether minors should be afforded such rights in
other situations is the subject of debate involving the mature minor doctrine.

C. The Mature Minor Doctrine: Respecting the Rights ofAutonomous
Adolescents?
The theory behind the mature minor doctrine 164 is simple: if a minor has
sufficient competence to make an autonomous decision, that decision should
be respected as such. 165 In other words, certain minors are mature enough to
know what decisions would be in accord with their conception of wellbeing, thus obviating protection from either their parents or the State. A few
statutes giving minors found to i6have requisite
states have
S 166enacted
the authority to consent to medical treatment, 167 while others
competence

162. See Scott, supra note 6, at 574 (calling Justice Powell's prescription for judicial
bypass "vague," which has led to an "indeterminate legal standard"). Scott indicates that
in certain jurisdictions judges seem to rubber-stamp petitions of pregnant teens, while
courts in others have a standard of maturity that few minors are able to meet. Id.
163. Some commentators argue that the extension of these rights to minors in the
abortion context is more about compromise than truly respecting adolescent decisionmaking ability. See, e.g., id. at 575.
164. But see Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless
Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS L. J. 1265, 1311 (2000) (noting that the use of "doctrine"
implies a "consensus of judicial decisions," which in this case would be a misnomer
because only certain jurisdictions have empowered minors under specific circumstances).
165. See id. Professor Hartman argues that "autonomous decisional ability should be
the cornerstone for a coherent legal model governing issues of adolescence"). Id. at
1270-71.
166. Other states have created a bright-line rule allowing adolescents to consent to
treatment without a competency determination. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-280
(2000) (permitting minors sixteen and older to consent to medical treatment); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 40:1095 (2001) (allowing any minor to consent to medical treatment). The
Louisiana statute specifically excludes the ability to refuse medical treatment to which
the minor's parent or guardian has given consent. See Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy,
supra note 164, at 1311 (citing Op. LA. ATT'Y GEN. No. 88-232 (1988)).
167. See Rosato, The End of Adolescence, supra note 63, at 779 n.72 (citing ARK.
CODE ANN. § 20-9-602(7) (2000) (allowing unemancipated minors to consent to medical
treatment if they are of sufficient intelligence to understand and appreciate the
consequences of their decision); IDAHO CODE § 39-4302 (2000) (stating that any person
of competent intelligence to comprehend the nature and the significant risks posed by the

260
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give children with sufficient age and competence a stronger voice in
custodial disputes.' 6 8 For the most part, however, the mature minor doctrine
exists as a creature of common law, the seeds of which were planted in the
69
early 1970s.'
Perhaps the first manifestation by the Supreme Court of the importance of
inquiring into the wishes of adolescents came in Justice Douglas' partial
dissent in Yoder. 17 Recall that the majority in Yoder considered the issue to
involve a conflict between the Amish parents and the State. 1 7 1 Justice
Douglas disagreed with this characterization, stating that "[w]here the child
is mature enough to express potentially conflicting desires, it would be an
invasion of the child's rights to permit such an imposition without
canvassing his views."' 172 Importantly, Douglas went on to suggest that if a
child disagrees with his or her parents' decision "and is mature enough to
have that desire respected, the State ma well be able to override the
parents' religiously motivated objections."'
Though his language is ethically charged, a standard for determining
maturity, or what makes a child's particular desire deserving of respect, is
noticeably missing. 174 For example, it would be difficult to defend an
argument that a child is mature simply by virtue of her expressing a desire
that conflicts with her parents. That being said, Douglas at least presented
the notion that when children's rights are potentially abridged, their voices

medical treatment is competent to consent on his own behalf); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
129.030(2) (2001) (permitting a minor that understands the purpose of the examination
and treatment and its probably outcome to consent to the medical treatment, but provider
must make efforts to seek minor's consent to communicate with parents in most
instances); cf ALASKA STAT. 25.20.025(2) (2000) (allowing a minor to consent to
medical treatment without parental consent where the minor is first counseled before such
treatment)).
168. See Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 164, at 1287-90. On a related
note, juvenile criminal offenders found to have sufficient capacity are often tried and
convicted as adults. Id.at 1293-96.
169. See Wadlington, supra 110, at 321-22 & 322 n.53 (arguing that, at least initially,
the "mature minor doctrine was based less on concern about children's rights than on the
desire to negate a battery action against medical personnel if an older minor consented in
near-emergency situations or when a parent was unavailable").
170. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-49 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part).
171. See supra Part II.
172. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242.
173. Id.
174. In a footnote, Justice Douglas pointed to the work of child psychologists and
sociologists for the proposition that children aged fourteen and older have moral and
intellectual maturity approaching that of an adult. Id. at 245 n.3.
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should be heard. 175 In the years following Yoder, courts 176 as well as
scholars, began to point to the Douglas dissent when "calling for the
' 77
recognition of children's rights independent of the rights of their parents."'
Ethically, it is not enough to say that children deserve to make decisions
on their own; rather, there must be some evidence that they have sufficient
competence to make autonomous decisions deserving of respect. The
178
presumption that minors lack this ability has already been discussed;
whether that presumption applies with equal force to adolescents is another
question. 179
Those who argue in favor of increased adolescent decisional rights point
out that "the existing law fails to take into account a developmental
perspective that 'examines the soundness of age-based legal policies in light
' 180
of scientific research and theory on psychological development."
Beginning in the late 1970s-notably very soon after the Supreme Court
first extended decision-making authority to pregnant teens in the abortion
the
context-several psychological studies were conducted questioning
81
decision-making capabilities of minors in the medical setting.,
suggest that182older adolescents are no less
Taken together, these studies
•
Lois Weithom and Susan
competent to provide consent than adults.
Campbell specifically compared the decision-making capabilities of
variously aged minors and young adults. They found that minors aged

175.

For a discussion about the difficulty in ascertaining a child's wishes and beliefs

in the religious context, see infra Part V.
176. See discussion ofIn re Green, supra Part 1I(finding that although the State could
not interfere with the parent's religious decision to refuse consent for a medical
procedure, the case should be remanded for a determination of the child's wishes).
177. Buss, supra note 72, at 53, n.4. For the purpose of this article two rights are of
particular importance: the right of children to make medical decisions on their own, and
the right to practice religion independent of their parents' right to free exercise of
religion.
178. See supra Part 1I.
179. Hartman, Coming ofAge, supra note 136, at 411.
180. Rosato, The End of Adolescence, supra note 63, at 783 (quoting Laurence
Steinberg & Elizabeth Cauffman, A Developmental Perspective on Serious Juvenile
Crime: When Should Juveniles be Treatedas Adults?, 63 FED. PROBATION 52, 52 (1999)).
181. See, e.g., Grisso & Vierling, supra note 58; Lois A. Weithorn & Susan B.
Campbell, The Competency of Children and Adolescents to Make Informed Treatment
Decisions, 53 CHILD DEV. 1589 (1982); David G. Scherer & N. Dickon Reppucci,
Adolescents' Capacities to Provide Voluntary Informed Consent, 12 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 123 (1988); David G. Scherer, The Capacities of Minors to Exercise
Voluntariness in Medical Treatment Decisions, 15 LAW& HUM. BEHAV. 431 (1991).
182.

See Hartman, Adolescent Decisional Autonomy, supra note

(discussing relevant studies in adolescent decision-making capacity).

21, at 96-98
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fourteen and older "demonstrate a level of competency equivalent to that of
adults."' 83 These results support earlier work performed by Jean Piaget
which suggested that individuals enter the "formal operational stage" during
adolescence, and thereafter "possess the cognitive capability to reason,
understand,
appreciate, and articulate decisions comparable to young
84
adults."'

Although these studies cast doubt on the appropriateness of applying a
presumption of incompetence to all adolescents, there are critics. Some have
argued that the findings are limited because the subjects were typically white
and middle-class.1 85 Others suggest that these studies define competence too
narrowly, or fail to consider psychosocial factors that impact adolescents
differently than adults.' s6 In one of the first studies, Thomas Grisso and
Linda Vierling articulated that "it would be inaccurate to conclude that all
1 87
adolescents are intellectually capable of providing independent consent."
At the very least, these critiques indicate that it would be imprudent to
reverse the current practice and adopt a presumption of competence for all
adolescents.
The cases that have dealt with the issue of whether to adopt a mature
minor exception have called for or applied an individualized assessment of
the maturity of the adolescents in question. 188 When reading these cases it is
important to remain cognizant of the conflict involved, and whether the
minor is truly empowered to decide in accordance with his or her own

conception of well-being.

183. Weithom & Campbell, supra note 181, at 1595. These findings supported earlier
studies performed by Jean Piaget.
184. Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy, supra note 164, at 1285-86 (citing to early
studies performed by Jean Piaget).
185. Rosato, The Endof Adolescence, supra note 63, at 785 n. 110.
186. Id.at 786.
187. Grisso & Vierling, supra note 58, at 421. The authors also suggest that the same
might be true for a random sampling of adult subjects; however, because adults are
presumed competent, they are not subject to the same scrutiny.
188. The cases discussed below generally fall into three categories: (1) those that
adopt a mature minor doctrine and apply it to the adolescent in question; (2) those that
adopt the doctrine and hold that the minor's maturity should have been determined; and
(3) those that refuse to adopt the mature minor doctrine or hold that it does not apply to
the given circumstances.
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1. Cardwell v. Bechtol'

89

In perhaps the seminal case addressing the mature minor doctrine, 190 the
Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether the State should adopt the
doctrine as an exception to the rule that physicians must obtain parental
consent before treating minors. 91 Without her parents' knowledge, Sandra
Cardwell (aged seventeen years, seven months) visited an osteopathic
physician who had treated her father in the past. 192 The physician
incorrectly concluded that Sandra's back pain was not caused by a herniated
proceeded to treat her through manipulations of the neck, spine and
disc, and
93
legs.'

When Sandra's pain did not subside, and she developed bladder and
bowel retention coupled with decreased sensation in her legs and buttocks,
she underwent diagnostic testing confirming that she did in fact have a
herniated disc. She eventually had surgery performed in an attempt to
correct the problem, but almost one year later she still had not regained full
bowel control or lower body sensation. 194 Sandra and her parents filed suit
against the osteopathic physician for malpractice (the misdiagnosis), battery
(failure to obtain parental consent),195 negligent failure to obtain consent,
and failure to obtain informed consent.' 6 This implies that the parents
disagreed with Sandra's decision to see the osteopath in the first place.
The trial court granted the physician's motion for directed verdict on the
malpractice claim because the Cardwells failed to meet their burden of
proof. The court also instructed the jury that if it found Sandra to be mature,
the physician was not liable for battery or failure to obtain informed
consent.1 97 The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the physician, but
the appellate court reversed, holding that neither the Tennessee Legislature
nor the State's Supreme Court had adopted the mature minor exception to
the parental consent requirement. 198

189.

724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987).

190. Although earlier cases recognized an exception to obtaining parental consent in
litigation involving claims of battery, Cardwell is one of the most oft-sited cases
regarding the mature minor doctrine. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151,
1154 (Pa. 2000); Belcher v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., 422 S.E.2d 827, 836 (W.Va.
1992); In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1989).
191.

Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 741.

192.

Id. at 743.

193.

Id. at 741-42.

194.

Id. at 742.

195.

See supra Part I.

196.

Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 742.

197.

Id.

198.

Id.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court permitted an appeal, and used it as an
opportunity to formally adopt the mature minor doctrine. In so doing, the
court noted the State's medical treatment exception statutes, 199 and its
treatment of older adolescents in the criminal context. 200 The court was not
willing to grant physicians a "general license" to treat any minor without
parental consent; rather it held that application of the mature minor doctrine
is "dependent on the facts of each case." 20 1 Specifically, the court stated:
Whether a minor has the capacity to consent to medical treatment
depends upon the age, ability, experience, education, training, and
degree of maturity or judgment obtained by the minor, as well as
upon the conduct and demeanor of the minor at the time of the
incident involved. Moreover, the totality of the circumstances, the
nature of the treatment and its risks or probable consequences, and
the minor's ability to appreciate the risks and consequences are to
be considered.2 °2
The court concluded that this determination is a question of fact properly left
in the hands of the jury. In Sandra's case, the court felt that the jury was
justified in concluding that she "had the ability, maturity, experience,
20 3
education and judgment. . . to consent knowingly to medical treatment."
Sandra was thus empowered as a mature minor to consent to treatment
regardless of her parents' disagreement.
20 4
2. Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center

Another early case addressing the mature minor doctrine involved Larry
Belcher who was aged seventeen years, eight months, and suffered from
muscular dystrophy.
After a fit of breathing difficulty Larry's parents
took him to the emergency room, where he subsequently suffered breathing

199.

See supra Part III. A. The court concluded that the statutes are not exhaustive,

nor do they "abrogate judicial adoption of an exception to the general common law rule."
Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 744 (Tenn. 1987). But see Commonwealth v.
Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1155 (Pa. 2000) (holding that similar statutes indicate the extent

of legislative intent to grant minors the right to consent to or refuse medical treatment).
200.

Cardwell, 724 S.W.2d at 745.

201. Id.
202. Id. at 748.
203. Id. at 749. Interestingly, relying on the Rule of Sevens, the court reassigned
presumptions regarding the capacity to make medical decisions: those under the age of
seven still require parental consent; those aged seven to fourteen are presumed

incompetent, but can rebut that presumption; while those aged fourteen to eighteen, like
adults, are presumed competent. Id.
204.

422 S.E.2d 827 (W.Va. 1992).

205.

Id. at 829.
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failure, was intubated,
placed on a respirator, and transferred to the pediatric
2 6
intensive care unit. 0
Larry's treating physician asked his parents whether they would want
Larry reintubated should he suffer breathing failure again. Although they
initially were undecided, they ultimately told the physician that "they did not
want Larry reintubated or resuscitated unless Larry requested it." 20 7 Without
consulting Larry, the physician entered a "Do Not Resuscitate" order into
Larry's progress notes.
When Larry later suffered another respiratory
arrest, he went into cardiac failure and died. His parents filed suit for
wrongful death and medical malpractice, but lost at trial.2 0 9 They appealed
the issue of whether Larry should have been consulted prior to entering the
DNR order, which the West Virginia Supreme Court suggested would
require recognition of the "so-called2 10 'mature minor' exception to the
common law rule of parental consent."
Citing to Cardwell,2 11 the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted the
mature minor doctrine under the common law of the State. 2 12 The court
held:
Application of the mature minor rule would vary from case to
case. The focus would be on the maturity level of the minor at
issue, and whether that minor has the capacity to appreciate the
nature and risks involved of the procedure to be performed, or the
treatment to be administered or withheld.213

206. Id.at 830. Testimony during trial indicated that when Larry was later extubated
he seemed "anxious and apprehensive," and motioned his head "no" when asked by his
treating physician whether he would want to be reintubated. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. The physician claimed that he did not consult Larry because "(1) he was
emotionally immature due to his disease; (2) he was on medication which diminished his
capacity; (3) involving him in the decision would have increased his anxiety, thus
reducing his chances of survival; and (4) Larry's parents told [him] that they did not want
Larry involved." Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 831. Interestingly, the court could have decided the case under a parents'
rights approach, because it was Larry's parents' wish that he be consulted that was
violated.
211. The West Virginia court listed factors almost identical to those listed in
Cardwell. See Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 748 (Tenn. 1987).
212. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 837. By utilizing the State's common law, the court
obviated the need to discuss whether mature minors have federal constitutional rights to
consent to or refuse medical treatment.
213. Id.at 838. Note that Cardwell addressed only the right to consent to treatment
whereas the court in Belcher suggests the right to refuse treatment as well.
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Like Cardwell,214 the court in Belcher considered this determination to be a
question of fact; it is "a matter for the jury to decide, and not for this Court
to speculate. ' 2 15 On the other hand, the court concluded that "where there is
a conflict between the intentions of one or both parents and the minor, the
physician's good faith assessment of the minor's maturity level would
immunize him or her from liability for the failure to obtain parental
consent. ' 2 16
Rather than itself making a determination as to Larry's
maturity, the court remanded the case so that Larry's maturity could be
2 17
assessed in light of the court's adoption of the mature minor doctrine.
The court recognized at least the potential for conflict between parents and
their children, and empowered mature minors to consent to or refuse medical
treatment over their parents' objection."'
The West Virginia court did not draw a distinction between consenting to
or refusing medical treatment. In support of this, one might argue that once
minors are deemed mature they should be afforded rights equal to those of
adults; and adults clearly may refuse medical treatment, even where death is
the probable result. 21 9 Many commentators, however, are not ready to go
this far when it comes to minors refusing life-saving,
or life-sustaining
medical treatment. 22 2 Complicating this issue further, is the fact that parents

214. The West Virginia court, however, was unwilling to rely on the Rule of Sevens.
Id. at 837 n.13.
215. id. at 837. The court acknowledged that initially physicians would be given the
difficult task of determining a minor's maturity, thus necessitating good record keeping.
Id. at 837 n.14.
216. Id. at 838.
217. Id.
218. The court admitted, however, that the State's legislature could prohibit
recognition of the mature minor doctrine should it so desire. Belcher, 422 S.E.2d at 838.
219. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
220. Life-saving medical treatment refers to life or death curative treatment that
promises that the patient's "short- and long-term prognoses are excellent." Harvey, supra
note 22, at 316. For example treatments that, if given, will restore the patient to a healthy
state, but if withheld, will result in certain death - blood transfusions, or insulin treatment
for diabetics.
221. Life-sustaining treatment, on the other hand, generally involves a quality of life
inquiry. The patient is likely to succumb to the underlying disease, but with treatment,
could expect to live longer than without. Id. Many cancer treatments fall into this
category, because they may extend life for a few months or years, but often involve
physically burdensome side-effects.
222. Compare Driggs, supra note 62 (arguing that adolescents should never be
permitted to refuse treatment when death is the probable outcome), and Penkower, supra
note 148 (arguing that the mature minor doctrine should not be utilized to permit minors
to refuse life-saving medical treatment), with Harvey, supra note 22 (arguing for a sliding
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are typically not permitted to make decisions that put their children's lives at
risk.
3. In re Swan

224

Seventeen-year-old Chad Swan was in an automobile accident that left
him in a persistent vegetative state. His body was maintained by lifesustaining treatment involving a gastrostomy tube providing hydration and
nutrition.125 When the tube eventually eroded, the attending physicians
recommended that it not be reinserted; Chad's parents agreed.
When Swan was decided, the notion of a "right to die" for any individual
was relatively new. 226 States typically challenged decisions to remove
gastrostomy tubes and the like by raising four State interests: (1) interests in
the preservation of human life; (2) prevention of suicide; (3) third party
227
interests; and (4) protecting the integrity of the medical profession.
Taking a proactive stance, and fearing civil or criminal liability, the Swans
sought declaratory relief from a trial court in Maine. 228 The trial court
listened to evidence presented by Chad's mother about his prior wishes, 229
and
concluded that Chad would not have consented to reinsertion of the tube.
The District Attomey, on behalf of the State, challenged the court's ruling
raising above-referenced interests (1), (3), and (4). The attorney also argued
that any right Chad might have to refuse medical treatment "was
significantly reduced because [he] was under the legal age of majority when
he expressed those wishes." 230 The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
rejected these arguments, finding that Chad's status as a minor was merely a
"factor to be considered by the fact finder in assessing the seriousness and

scale of adolescent empowerment depending upon the type of treatment involved). But
see Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden Heuvel, Mature Minors Should Have the
Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J. L. MED. & ETHics 109 (2000).
223. See supra Part II.
224. 569 A.2d 1202 (Me. 1990).
225. Id. at 1202.
226.

See generally ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE (2d ed. 1995) (providing a

comprehensive analysis of the history and development of the right to choose death rather
than medical treatment).
227. See, e.g., Hartman, Coming ofAge, supra note 136, at 441.
228. In re Swan, 569 A.2d at 1203-04.
229. Id. at 1205-06. Chad's mother testified to remembering Chad state "'If I can't be
myself... no way... let me go to sleep,"' when discussing a young boy his grandmother
knew who was in a persistent vegetative state. Similarly, after visiting a comatose friend
in the hospital, Chad told his brother "'I don't ever want to get like that... I would want
somebody to let me leave-to go in peace."' Id.
230. Hartman, Coming ofAge, supranote 136, at 440.
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deliberateness" of his statements.23 1 In making clear that its decision was
based on Chad's beliefs-as opposed to the court's or parents' view of what
was best for him 232 -the court concluded that Chad's wishes to not be
maintained in a persistent vegetative state reflected "well-informed desires
as to medical treatment" and should be followed.233
Although the court decided the case based upon Chad's previously
expressed wishes, the manifested conflict was between the parents and the
State. For instance, if the parents had wanted Chad to be maintained by the
gastrostomy tube, one wonders whether his previously expressed wishes to
the contrary would have surfaced.
Therefore, it is not clear how
empowering Swan would be for future cases involving adolescent refusal of
life-saving or life-sustaining medical treatment where the child's wishes
conflict with the parents'.

4. Benny Agrelo and Billy Best
In the mid 1990s, two adolescents gained wide publicity in their attempts
to forego medical treatment. 234 Benny was a fifteen-year-old Floridian who
had undergone two liver transplants. He took immunosuppressant that
caused severely debilitating side effects to prevent his body from rejecting
the organs.235 Benny ultimately decided to stop taking the medication
against both his parents' and doctors' wishes, although his mother, at some
point, began to support his decision. 236 When the hospital discovered this,
they instituted neglect proceedings against his mother.
Benny 23was
taken
8
to the hospital where he resisted resuming the immunosuppressant
A juvenile court judge held separate meetings with Benny, his mother and
his health care team, in which the judge determined that Benny was mature
enough to understand what he was doing, and prohibited further interference
with his wishes. 23 9 Benny returned home and died from liver failure a few
months later, but because juvenile court records are sealed, it is unclear what
factors the judge considered in making the determination. 24 Benny was

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

In re Swan, 569 A.2d at 1205.
See Rosato, The End ofAdolescence, supra note 63, at 781.
Id.at 1205-06.
See Harvey, supra note 22, at 307.
Id. at 307.
Drigg, supra note 62, at 687.
See supra Part 1I(discussing conflicts between parents and the State).
Driggs, supranote 62, at 688.
Id.

240. Harvey, supranote 22, at 307.
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empowered to make the decision to forego medical treatment, but like Chad,
he had agreement from his mother.
Billy Best was a sixteen-year-old resident of Massachusetts suffering from
Hodgkin's lymphoma. 241 Two and a half months into a six month
chemotherapy regimen, Billy refused further treatment and, fearing that his
parents would force him to undergo additional rounds of chemo, he left
home and ran to Texas. Although Billy's physicians indicated that the
treatment had a ninety percent cure rate, his parents promised not to force
him to submit to further treatment. 242 Massachusetts chose not to intervene,
and Billy returned home. 243 Rather than continue chemotherapy, Billy
began a series of alternative therapies that succeeded in sending his illness
into remission. 244 While this was good for Billy, the question of whether the
State would have intervened had Billy's condition turned grave and his
parents continued to uphold his wish to forego traditional medical treatment
remains open.
The aforementioned cases suggest that in certain states, depending on the
circumstances, the administration of life-saving or life-sustaining medical
treatment to adolescents who do not want such treatment may be foregone
where the minor is adjudged mature and the parents agree with the decision.
This stands in contrast to the general rule that state governments intervene in
these situations under the assumption that parents who place their children's
lives at risk are acting contrary to the child's well-being. Further, the cases
do not provide guidance as to the level of maturity a child would need to
refuse treatment where death is the likely result.
Notably, the religious beliefs of the parents were not a factor in any of the
above cases; rather, the decisions were based upon medical information and
quality of life determinations. Recall that religion played a major role in
many of the earlier cases defining the scope of parental rights and the duty
of the state to intervene as parens patriae.245 While parents were permitted
to remove their children from formal schooling based upon their religious
beliefs, they were not permitted to put their children's lives at risk. Without
consulting the children in question, the conflict in each of these cases was
between the parents' and state's beliefs about what would be in the
children's best interests.
When the child's life is at stake, the state presumes that his or her wellbeing is better served by being kept alive than by dying according to the

241.
Susan D. Hawkins, Note, Protecting the Rights and Interests of Competent
Minors in Litigated Medical Treatment Disputes, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2075, 2075

(1996).
242.

Harvey, supra note 22, at 307.

243.

Id.

244.

Driggs, supra note 62, at 688.

245.

See supra Part II.
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parents' chosen religious beliefs. The following cases involve parents and
children who attempted to avoid state intervention by arguing that the choice
to die is based not upon the parents' beliefs, but upon the child's.

IV.

THE MATURE MINOR DOCTRINE AND RELIGIOUS REFUSALS IN CASE

LAW

The analysis of the following cases is meant to shed light on the
inconsistencies in the adoption and application of a state recognized mature
minor doctrine, especially when religious beliefs are involved. In practice,
the mature minor doctrine should serve to empower adolescents capable of
autonomous decision-making. To that end, the focus in each case should be
on whether the child's decision appears to be in line with her true conception
of well-being, regardless of her parents' beliefs.2 4 6 Each fails in this regard.
A. In re E.G.

247

Emestine Gregory was a seventeen-and-a-half-year-old female diagnosed
in 1987 with acute nonlymphatic leukemia, a malignant disease of the white
blood cells. 2 4 8 She was admitted to the hospital where physicians told her
that the recommended course of treatment involved chemotherapy coupled
with blood transfusions. 249 While both Ernestine and her mother agreed to
all other forms of treatment, they adamantly opposed any blood transfusions,
based upon their religious beliefs.25 °
In response to this refusal, attending physicians at the hospital contacted
the office of the State's Attorney, which office subsequently filed a petition
in the juvenile court seeking a finding that Ernestine was medically
neglected by her mother. 251 At the time of the initial hearing, Ernestine
suffered greatly from depleted platelet counts and had blood that transported
oxygen at only one-fifth to one-sixth normal capacity. 252 A treating

246.

To date, no court has permitted a child to choose to refuse medical treatment

without parental consent where death is the probable result. As will be shown in Part V
infra, in the religious context, parental consent should not necessarily bolster the child's
decision to refuse treatment.
247.

549 N.E. 2d 322 (111. 1989); 515 N.E. 2d 286 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).

248. InreE.G., 549N.E. 2d at323.
249. In re E.G., 515 N.E. 2d at 287. Ernestine's treating physician testified that with
treatment her survival rate was twenty to twenty-five percent, with a remission rate of
eighty percent. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323.
250. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 287.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 296 (McNamara, J., dissenting).
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physician testified that Ernestine's condition left her "excessively fatigued
and incoherent," and that without transfusion, she "would likely die within a
month., 253 The physician also indicated, however, that in his belief
"Ernestine was competent to understand the consequences of accepting or
rejecting treatment," and he was "impressed with her maturity and the
sincerity of her beliefs. '254 At this point, "[t]he court found probable cause
to believe that [Emestine] was medically neglected and appointed the
hospital official
temporary custodian with power to consent to all medical
255
treatment."
Roughly six weeks later, the court called the case for reconsideration.
Ernestine had been continuously receiving blood transfusions and was able
to testify. 256 Ernestine stated that "she had studied her faith for several
years, and that she had been baptized at age 16, which made her an adult in
the eyes of her church. 257 She further testified that "the decision to refuse
blood transfusions was her own and that she fully understood the nature of
her disease and the consequences of her decision. She indicated that her
decision was not based258on any wish to die, but instead was grounded in her
religious convictions."
In addition to her own testimony, Emestine presented several witnesses to
substantiate her maturity and decision-making capability. One such witness
was a psychiatrist who testified that, in his opinion, Emestine "had the
maturity level of an 18 to 21 year old," and that she had the "competency to
make an informed decision to refuse the blood transfusions, even if the
choice was fatal. 259
In the end, concluding that it was in her best interests, the trial court ruled
that Emestine was medically neglected, and appointed a guardian to consent
to medical treatment. 260 The court went on to state that Ernestine was 'a
mature 17-year-old individual,' that [she] reached her decision on an

253. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 323.
254. id.
255. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 287-88.
256. In re E. G., 549 N.E.2d at 323.
257. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 288.
258. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324. Jehovah's Witnesses believe that death is a deep
sleep from which they will be awoken on the day of Armageddon. See THE JEHOVAH'S
WITNESS TRADITION, supra note 119, at 6. However, if they receive a blood transfusion
they can sever their relationship with God, forfeit a chance of eternal life, and become
excommunicated from the congregation. Id.at 8.
259. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324. Ironically, the doctor found Emestine to be
mature based upon her responses to questions regarding her future plans; a future that
would be precluded by allowing her to refuse the blood transfusions. In re E.G., 515
N.E.2d at 293 (McNamara, J. dissenting).
260. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324.
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independent basis, and that she was 'fully aware that death [was] assured
absent treatment. ' - 261 However, the court also expressed concern that
"outward appearances and expressed beliefs often do not reflect the
individual's true wishes." 262 Although heavily considering Ernestine's and
her mother's wishes-and the religious basis for
those wishes-the court felt
263
that the State's interest in the case was greater.
On appeal, Ernestine and her mother argued that the trial court's order
violated Ernestine's constitutional rights guaranteed under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments by infringing on her religious freedom. 264 At the
time this case was heard, Illinois case law clearly established that adults
have the right to refuse medical treatment for religious reasons under the
Constitution. 265 Further, it was apparent that parents are not permitted 266
to
make decisions harmful to their children based upon religious beliefs,
including refusing blood transfusions. 267 It was unclear, however, whether a
minor has the constitutional right to refuse medical treatment for themselves.
For an answer to this question, the appellate court turned to the United
States Supreme Court's decisions in the abortion arena. 268 The appellate
court noted that the Supreme Court has yet to extend such rights beyond
269
reproductive matters, but found that "such an extension is inevitable."
The court stated that "[g]iven the paramount importance of religious
freedom in the history of our nation," it is unlikely that less protection would
be afforded to such freedoms than the rights at stake in abortion cases.270
The appellate court ultimately held that Ernestine was medically
neglected; however, by virtue of that neglect, she became partially
emancipated. 2711 As a partially emancipated mature minor, 272 Ernestine had

261.

Id.

262. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 293 (McNamara, J. dissenting).
263. In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d at 324. The court did not identify which particular State
interests were greater.
264. Id.
265. See In re Estate of Brooks, 205 N.E.2d 435 (Il1. 1965).
266. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 289 (citing the oft-quoted martyrdom language in
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
267. See Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ill. 1952).
268. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 290. See supra Part IV.
269. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d at 290.
270. Id.
271. The court relied on the Illinois' Emancipation of Mature Minors Act that states
that minors sixteen years of age or over found to be neglected may be partially or
completely emancipated upon a showing of"capacity to manage his own affairs." Id.
272.

The appellate court based its determination of Emestine's maturity on the

statements made by the trial court, not a separate inquiry.
dissenting).

Id. at 293 (McNamara, J.
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the right to refuse the blood transfusion regardless of her mother's consent,
such that the trial court's order was "an unjustified abridgement of her First
Amendment rights., 273 The State's petition to the Supreme Court of Illinois
was granted.
By the time the argument reached the Illinois Supreme Court, Ernestine
had turned eighteen.
The court decided to hear the case, although
technically moot, because it presented "an issue of substantial public
interest. '' 2 74 That issue being whether minors have a right to refuse medical
treatment.
The Illinois Supreme Court began by acknowledging that the common law
age of majority, eighteen, is not "an impenetrable barrier that magically
precludes a minor from possessing and exercising certain rights normally
associated with adulthood. 275 It went on to detail statutory exceptions
where minors are granted the right to seek medical attention including
treatment.276 The court also noted that the Illinois Criminal Code provides a
"sliding scale of maturity" that permits certain minors to be tried and
convicted as adults. 27 Finally, like the appellate court, it looked to the
abortion arena where the United States2 7 Supreme
Court has extended
8
protection to minors under the Constitution.
With this backdrop, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that, if
adjudged a mature minor by clear and convincing evidence, Ernestine had
the right to control her own health care. 279 The court felt that a trial judge
must be employed to make this determination in light of the State interests
involved; namely, in the sanctity of life and the State's duty as parens
patriae to protect minors. 28 The court created a common law right to
consent to or refuse medical treatment for minors "mature enough to
appreciate the consequences of [their]
actions," and "mature enough to
28
exercise the judgment of an adult." '
The court concluded, however, that the minor's right is not absolute, and
must be weighed against four State interests: "(1) the preservation of life; (2)
protecting the interests of third parties; (3) prevention of suicide; and (4)
maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession." 282 Of these, the

273.
274.

Id. at 291.
In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (Il. 1989).

275. Id.

276. Id.
277.

Id. at 326.

278.

Id.

279.

Id. at 326-27.

280.

Id.

281.

Id. at 327-28.

282.

Id. at 328.

274
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court felt that in Emestine's case, the interests of third parties were most
significant. The court stated that if Ernestine's mother opposed her refusal
of the blood transfusions the court would have given serious consideration to
the mother's wishes. 283 Because the court found that a mature minor "may
exercise a common law right to consent to or refuse medical care," it
declined to address whether refusing medical treatment for religious reasons
is protected under the First Amendment. 284 By doing so, the court
downplayed the relevance of religious beliefs as the basis for Emestine's
refusal of the blood transfusions.
In sum, the Illinois Supreme Court held that if Emestine were found to be
a mature minor by clear and convincing evidence, she would have had the
right to control her medical care. Interestingly, because Ernestine was
eighteen by the time of this ruling, the court found no point in remanding the
case to the trial court for a proper determination of whether she was a mature
285
minor at the time of the initial hearing.
This appears to be very empowering for future cases, but is limited for
two reasons. First, Emestine's particular circumstance was not considered
by the Illinois Supreme Court, so cases with similar facts cannot point to the
Supreme Court's ruling as dispositive of maturity. Second, even if the
Supreme Court had held Emestine to be mature, it stated that if her mother
had not agreed with her decision, it would "weigh heavily against the
minor's right to refuse." 286 Thus, even if mature, Ernestine's decision would
not have been respected as autonomous. Paradoxically, this suggests that a
mature minor is only empowered to refuse life-saving or sustaining medical
treatment to the extent that his or her decision coincides with a parent's
belief that alone would be restricted by the State. 287 Compare the analyses
used by the Illinois courts to that utilized by a trial court in New York.
288
B. In the Matter of Long Island Jewish Medical Center

Philip Malcolm, just seven weeks shy of eighteen, was admitted to the
hospital when he presented to the emergency room with dangerously low
hemoglobin and hematocrit blood counts. Both he and his parents refused

283. Id.
284. Id. at 327-28.
285. Id. The court also reversed the appellate court's finding of medical neglect on
the part of Emestine's mother, because had she been declared a mature minor, no neglect
could have been found. Id.at 328.
286. Id. at 328.
287. In the religious context, such a consideration is problematic. See infra Part V.
288. 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
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any blood transfusions as members of the Jehovah's Witness faith. 2" The
next morning, the hospital and physicians petitioned the court for an order
authorizing what they called necessary treatment. Philip and his parents
were present at the hearing where they learned that Philip had cancer. The
physicians recommended a course of chemotherapy coupled with blood
transfusions.29 °
At the hearing, Philip's stepfather testified that he was adamant in his
refusal of blood transfusions, and believed Philip would die or be unable to
live a normal life regardless of what was done. Philip and his mother also
stated that they would not consent to blood transfusions. Noting that the
hearing was the first time the family learned of the cancer, the court
29 1
adjourned until the following day for the family to reconsider its position.
The following day, the hospital presented testimony that without a blood
transfusion Philip would likely die within the month; hence, there was need
for immediate action. Through testimony of the family, the court learned
that they had joined the Jehovah's Witnesses three years earlier. Philip
stated that he lost interest for a while, but began studying his faith again
about a year prior. He did not know the books of the Bible, but did seem to
understand the "basic tenet of the religion's prohibition regarding blood
transfusions., 292 Philip also stated that he considered himself a child, rather
than an adult, and that if the court ordered the transfusion, "it would not be
his responsibility or his sin." 293 Finally, the court noted that Philip always
consulted his parents before making a decision, and there was no evidence to
suggest that his parents encouraged him to make his own decision in this
case. 294
The court ultimately ordered immediate transfusions to stabilize Philip's
condition, but did not order chemotherapy or further transfusions. Philip and
his parents appealed the initial order raising this issue: "[d]oes an intelligent,
articulate young man, just weeks shy of his 18th birthday, have due process
right [sic] to demonstrate his capacity to make medical decisions for himself

289. Id. at 240.
290. Id. at 241. With treatment the cure rate was estimated to be twenty to twentyfive percent, and the likelihood of remission for months or years was seventy-five
percent. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. Philip believed that if he consented to a blood transfusion he would not have
everlasting life. Id.at 241-42.
293. Id. Certain Jehovah's Witness congregations believe that if blood transfusions
are given without the person's consent, his or her conscience is clear. See THE
JEHOVAH'S WITNEss TRADITION, supra note 119, at 3.
294. In the Matter of Long Island Jewish Medical Center, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 242.

Journalof ContemporaryHealth Law and Policy [Vol. XXII:233

consistent with his values ' and
convictions before he loses the right to control
295
what is done to his body?
The judge cited to In re E.G. and Belcher for the proposition that mature
minors may refuse medical treatment, 296 but concluded that "[w]hile this
court believes there is merit to the 'mature minor' doctrine, I find that Philip
Malcolm is not a mature minor." 297 Interestingly, the court noted that it did
not appear as though the decision was Philip's own, such that it was
consistent with his values and convictions. This implies that the court was
not convinced that Philip's decision to refuse the blood transfusions was
based upon religious beliefs in accordance with his well-being. 298 As a trial
court, however, the New York Supreme Court was hesitant to adopt the
mature minor doctrine; rather, it recommended that "the Legislature or the
appellate courts take a hard look at the 'mature minor'
299doctrine and make it
either statutory or decisional law in New York State."
The lower courts in Illinois, and the New York trial court, paid some
300
attention to the expressed religious beliefs of the adolescents in question.
The appellate court in Illinois was satisfied that Ernestine was mature
enough to refuse blood transfusions based upon her religious beliefs where
death was the certain result. The trial court in New York, on the other hand,
was not convinced of Philip's maturity to do the same. Not all courts feel
that maturity should even be a factor in determining whether minors should
be permitted to refuse medical treatment.
30 1
C. Novak v. Cobb County Kennestone Hospital Authority

Greg Novak was in a serious car accident when he was sixteen-years-old.
In the ambulance on the way to the hospital, he informed the paramedics that
he was a Jehovah's Witness, and as such, did not want any blood
transfusions administered. 302 At the hospital, his father consented to a

295. Id at 243.
296.

Unlike the courts in Belcher and In re E.G., however, this court made a

distinction between the right to consent and the right to refuse medical treatment, but did
not decide whether they should be equated. Id.

297. Id.
298. Id. It is only implicit, because there were limited facts before the court, and it did
not specify its exact reasoning for finding Philip to be too immature to make the decision.
299. Id.
300. The Illinois Supreme Court, on the other hand, did not discuss how Ernestine's
religious beliefs would come into play in a maturity determination.
301.
302.

849 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1994), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1996).
Novak, 849 F. Supp. at 1563.
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surgery that was performed without blood transfusions. 30 3 The following
day, Greg's treating physicians became concerned when blood tests revealed
that his blood was deficient in levels of both hemoglobin and hematocrit, but
Greg and his
mother remained adamant in their refusal of blood
30 4
transfusions.
Later that day, the physicians came to the conclusion that, without a blood
transfusion, Greg's life was in eminent danger.
They contacted the
hospital's legal team who petitioned for a court appointed guardian ad
litem.305 A hearing was held, without Greg's mother, and a guardian was
appointed. 306 On his second day in the hospital, Greg's guardian petitioned
the Superior Court of Cobb County to allow the hospital to perform the
blood transfusions.
The judge granted the petition, and Greg "was
physically restrained and transfused with three units of packed red blood
cel s. 307 Roughly six weeks later, Greg was released from the hospital and,
after a lengthy recovery period, "resumed normal physical activity for
person of his age but [suffered]
from a slight limp" resulting from his
08
accident-related injuries.
Greg and his mother filed suit raising a number of claims under federal
and state law. Initially, both mother and son alleged violations of their First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights, but the mother later dropped her First
Amendment claim. 30 9 For purposes of this discourse the important
allegation was that "as a 'mature minor,' [Greg] was denied his procedural
due process rights to refuse medical care under Georgia law." 310 The
hospital and physicians, on the other hand, argued that "any constitutional
interest in bodily self-determination Gregory Novak may have possessed did
not include the right to refuse medically necessary treatment and that
Georgia law
includes no provision for 'mature minors' to refuse medical
31
treatment." 1

303.

Id.Greg's parents were divorced, and although his mother had custody, she was

not available at first to give consent. She took over decision-making authority once she
arrived. Id.
304. Id.
305. A guardian ad litem is appointed by a court to appear in a lawsuit or on behalf of
an incompetent or minor party. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 725 (8th ed. 2004).

306.
307.

Novak, 849 F. Supp. at 1564.
Id.

308.
309.

Id.
Idat 1571. In a footnote, the court noted that the Supreme Court's ruling in

Prince was "dispositive of any deprivation of religious freedom claim" the mother might
have had. Id.at n. 16.
310. Id.at 1574.
311. Id.
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The court noted that minors do have constitutional rights, but added that
Greg and his counsel pointed to no authority for the proposition that a
mature minor "has a constitutional right to refuse a blood transfusion
pursuant to either the minor's First or Fourteenth Amendment rights; nor
could they. 312 This is an important distinction. The cases that have adopted
the mature minor doctrine have done so under state law, not federal
constitutional law. The United States Supreme Court has yet to extend
constitutional protection to minors in the medical setting beyond the
abortion context. 313 Therefore, Greg was required to show that Georgia state
law supported his claim.
In attempt to find support in state law, Greg pointed to statutory
exceptions to the general rule that minors cannot consent to medical
treatment. 314 The court noted that under Georgia statutory law, only those
over the age of eighteen are expressly permitted to refuse medical treatment;
such that, although minors are empowered to consent to certain treatments,
they are not statutorily permitted to refuse the same. 315 The court concluded
that there was no authority to suggest that Georgia recognizes a common law
A similar decision was recently reached by the
mature minor doctrine.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in a case with unusual facts.
317
D. Commonwealth v. Nixon

In June of 1997, sixteen-year-old Shannon Nixon began feeling ill. 3 18 As
members of the Faith Tabernacle Church, the Nixon's did not believe in
traditional medical treatment, choosing instead to address illness through

312. Id. Recall that the appellate court in In re E.G. found just that, but the Supreme
Court later mooted that determination by acknowledging a state common law mature
minor doctrine.
313. See supra Part III.
314. Novak, 849 F. Supp. at 1576; see also supra Part III.
315. Novak, 849 F. Supp. at 1576. But see In re Rena, 705 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (Mass.
1999) (in a case with similar facts-Rena, a Jehovah's Witness, lacerated her spleen in a
snowboarding accident potentially requiring blood transfusions, and the trial court gave
the hospital permission to administer them should they become necessary-the highest
court in Maine stated that the adolescent's maturity should be determined to ascertain
whether she could make an informed choice).
316. Novak, 849 F. Supp. at 1576. The district court's ruling was affirmed on appeal.
Novak v. Cobb County-Kennestone Hosp. Authority, 74 F.3d 1173 (11th Cir. 1996). It
should be noted, however, that a Georgia state court has yet to make a determination
about whether the state actually does acknowledge the mature minor doctrine.
317. 761 A.2d 1151 (Pa. 2000).
318. Id.at 1152.
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spiritual treatment. 319 They began to pray for Shannon's health, and took
her to their church to be anointed. Initially, Shannon's condition appeared to
improve, but it subsequently deteriorated and she slipped into a coma. She
died a few hours later from what an autopsy later determined
to be diabetes
320
acidosis, a "treatable, though not curable, condition."
Shannon's parents were subsequently tried and convicted of involuntary
manslaughter and endangering the welfare of a child, for which they were
sentenced to two-and-a-half to five years in prison and fined one thousand
dollars. 321 They appealed the conviction claiming in relevant part that (1)
Shannon had a constitutionally protected privacy right to refuse medical
treatment; and (2) Shannon was a322mature minor capable of making the
decision to refuse treatment herself.
Shannon's parents raised these arguments to suggest that Shannon was
mature enough to make a constitutionally-protected decision, therefore
abrogating their parental duty. 323 In other words, that Shannon's decision
was her own, and that they merely respected that decision because she was
mature enough to make it herself. Without any reported analysis, the
Superior Court held that Shannon, "as a mature minor, had a right to refuse
medical treatment pursuant to her constitutional right to privacy." 324 It went
on to state, however, that "this right does not discharge her arents' duty to
override her decision when her life is in immediate danger."
The court interpreted In re Green to suggest that a sixteen-year-old is
326
permitted to refuse a non life-threatening operation for religious beliefs,
but said that a different result is warranted where the minor's life is in
danger. 327
The court further considered its earlier decision in

319.

Id. Note the contrast between these beliefs and those of Jehovah's Witnesses

who will seek medical care except for blood transfusions.
320. Id. The facts are unusual, because in nearly all other reported cases of children
dying when their parents refuse to seek medical attention, the children were very young;
thus precluding application of the mature minor doctrine. See Merrick, supra note 2, at
290-97 (detailing cases that reached state Supreme Courts. Other than Shannon, the next
oldest child that died was eleven).
321.

Commonwealth v. Nixon, 718 A.2d 311, 312 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).

322. Id. Mr. and Mrs. Nixon also argued that the jury instructions were faulty and that
the sentence was excessive. Id
323. Id. at 313.
324.

Id. The Pennsylvania Superior Court, like the Illinois Appellate Court, took it

upon itself to extend constitutional rights to minors for medical decision-making beyond
the abortion context.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 313 (citing In re Green, 292 A.2d 387 (Pa. 1972)). This interpretation is not
entirely accurate. See supra Part II.
327. Nixon, 718 A.2d at 313.
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Commonwealth v. Cottam, where the parents of two malnourished children
argued that the fourteen and twelve-year-olds chose not to eat based on their
own religious beliefs. 328 The Cottam court held that "even if [the children]
were considered mature enough to freely exercise their religious beliefs, this
does not dispel [defendant's] duty while the children are in their care,
custody and' 329control to provide them with parental care, direction and
sustenance."
33
Finally, the court recalled its holding in Commonwealth v. Barnhart, 0
where it upheld the conviction of parents belonging to the Nixons' religion
who relied
solely on spiritual healing to treat their two-year-old son's
331
cancer.
In Barnhart,the court held that all parents in Pennsylvania owe a
duty of care to their children, "at the very least, to avert the child's untimely
,,332
death.
in ruling against the Nixons, the Superior Court held that even
though Shannon was a mature minor, this did not abrogate their parental
333
duty to seek medical treatment once her condition became life threatening.
The court held that the sentence imposed by the trial court was not
excessive despite the fact that it exceeded the sentencing guidelines. 334 Of
particular import was the fact that the Nixons were tried six years earlier on
the same charges when their nine-year-old son died of complications arising
from an ear infection; in that case, the Nixons pled no contest and received
two years of probation. 335 The Nixons appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted allocatur to consider two issues: (1) "whether
to adopt a 'mature minor doctrine' which would be an affirmative defense to
the parental duty to provide care to a minor;" and (2) "whether Shannon
Nixon had a right to refuse medical care pursuant to her privacy rights under
the constitutions of the United States and [Pennsylvania]. 336
The Supreme Court reviewed the cases from other jurisdictions that
acknowledged the mature minor doctrine, 337 and stated that "without passing
328.

Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Cottam, 616 A.2d 988 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).

329. Nixon, 718 A.2d at 313 (quoting Cottam, 616 A.2d at 1000). Importantly, the
Cottam court did not make an actual determination as to the ability of fourteen and
twelve-year-olds to-exercise their religious beliefs; rather it held that children may never
exercise religious beliefs where to do so would result in death.
330. 497 A.2d 616 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
331.

Nixon, 718 A.2d at 313.

332.

Id. (citing Barnhart,497 A.2d at 621). See also supra Parts II & III.

333.

Nixon, 718 A.2d at 313.

334.
335.
336.
337.
mature

Id.
Id.at315.
Commonwealth v. Nixon, 761 A.2d 1151, 1152 (Pa. 2000).
See infra Part II and above, discussing the history and development of the
minor doctrine.
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judgment upon the wisdom of the mature minor doctrine itself," the doctrine
is inapplicable to the circumstances surrounding the Nixons' case. 338 In the
court's opinion, the doctrine was inapplicable because "the legislature of
who are
[Pennsylvania] has provided a statute which identifies those minors
339
deemed sufficiently mature to give consent to medical treatment."
The court also relied on Pennsylvania's adoption of the treatment
exceptions, 340 to conclude that these statutes when read together suggest that
the legislature did not intend that "any minor, upon the slightest showing,
has capacity to consent to or to refuse medical treatment in a life and death
situation.' 34 Interestingly, the court's stated holding was that "the maturity
of an unemancipated minor 342
is not an affirmative defense ... to the charges
brought against Appellants."
Recall above where the court initially framed this issue as whether it
would adopt a mature minor doctrine which would be an affirmative defense
to the parental duty to provide care to a minor. There is an obvious
difference, however, between a wholesale refusal to adopt the mature minor
doctrine, and simply refusing to allow the mature minor doctrine to be
utilized as an affirmative defense after the fact when parents refuse to seek
Justice Cappy
out medical care and a child dies. In a powerful concurrence,
343
believed the majority opinion to affect the former.
Although agreeing with the ruling in the Nixons' case, Justice Cappy
would have adopted a mature minor doctrine in Pennsylvania. In his
opinion, "when it is demonstrated that a minor has the capacity to
understand the nature of his or her condition, appreciate the consequences of
the choices he or she makes, and reach a decision regarding medical
intervention in a responsible fashion, he or she should have the right to

338. Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1154.

339. Id.at 1155. For more on statutory exceptions, see supra Part III.
340. Nixon, 761 A.2d at 1155.

341. Id.In a footnote the court cited to the superior court's statement in Cottam, that
even if a minor were found to be mature enough to freely exercise their religious beliefs,
it would not abrogate the parents' affirmative duty to provide care direction and
sustenance. Id. at 1155-56 n.4.
342. Id. at 1155. Concerning the second issue for which allocatur was granted, the
court held that although Shannon had privacy rights protected by both the state and
federal constitutions, those rights were overridden by the compelling state interest as
parenspartriaeto protect the life of an unemancipated minor. Id. at 1156.
343. Id. at 1157-58 (Cappy, J. concurring). Justice Cappy felt that the majority
opinion was "ambiguous," but after "deliberation" ultimately concluded that "the
majority has evaluated the [mature minor] doctrine and determined that it will not be part
of our common law under any circumstances." Id. at 1157 n. I.
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consent to or refuse treatment." 344 Cappy felt that the record fell short of
establishing Shannon as a mature minor, but conceivably, she could have
been found mature enough to make the decision for herself.345 Following
Nixon, like Georgia, Pennsylvania does not acknowledge decision-making
authority for mature minors under any circumstances not previously existing
under statutory law. Justice Cappy aligned himself with the cases endorsing
the doctrine, and felt that this was the wrong result.
Review of the aforementioned cases reveals several important
implications. First, the mature minor doctrine has yet to be fully developed
or consistently applied. Some courts have deferred adoption of the doctrine
to State Legislature, preferring to stay out of the debate entirely. Other
courts have extended decision-making authority to minors for the purpose of
consenting to, but not refusing medical treatment. Still others would allow
minors adjudged mature to refuse even life-saving medical treatment if they
had agreement from their parents.
Second, although all courts willing to entertain the mature minor doctrine
speak of the minors' ability to understand their circumstances and appreciate
the consequences of their decisions, none provide specific guidelines for
measuring the capacity of minors to do so. In addition, the courts do not
recognize a significant difference between the refusal of and consent to
medical treatment, especially where the consequences are life or death in
nature. Ethically speaking, a higher level of competence is required to
refuse than consent to such treatment. 346 The cases dealing with the mature
minor doctrine in situations involving life or death decisions are deficient in
their discussions regarding whether minors are in fact capable of choosing to
refuse life-saving or sustaining medical treatment in accordance with their
underlying and enduring aims and values.
Finally, the cases in this area involving religious determinations by
adolescents pay disturbingly little attention to the religious aspect of the
decision-making process. While the courts are clear that they will not let
parents make the decision to refuse life-saving or sustaining medical
treatment on behalf of their children based upon religious beliefs, they do
not make a serious attempt to explicate the religious identity of the minors in
question.
The goal of the mature minor doctrine is to ascertain those adolescents
who have developed underlying and enduring aims and values, and thus, the
capability of making decisions that would promote their well-being without

344. Id. at 1158. The Superior Court, on the other hand, would never allow a minor to
refuse medical treatment where death is the probable outcome.
345. Id.
346. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 52 (arguing that "the appropriate level of
competence properly required for a particular decision must be adjusted to the
consequences of acting on that decision"). This will be discussed further in Part V.
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the aid of their parents or the State. Under the current framework, it is
possible that a minor could be permitted to refuse live-saving or sustaining
medical treatment based upon religious beliefs because they understand and
appreciate the medical aspects of their situation, yet do not have authentic
beliefs that are integral to their lives. This is a dangerous precedent.
For instance, the trial court believed that Ernestine was mature enough to
understand the medical nature of her condition, but was concerned that her
expressed religious beliefs were not necessarily her own. In extending
decisional authority to Emestine, the majority opinions from the appellate
courts in Illinois downplayed the religious aspect of the decision by
emphasizing her maturity with respect to the medical aspects of the
decision. 347 Further, Justice Cappy implied in his concurrence that if
Shannon had understood the nature of her condition and appreciated the
consequences of her decision, she should have been permitted to refuse
medical treatment. This ignores the possibility that Shannon may have been
impermissibly influenced by her parents and religious community in coming
to a refusal decision in contravention of her true sense of well-being.
Disregarding the religious aspect of the decision-making process leaves open
the possibility that practitioners will allow adolescents to choose to die for
their expressed beliefs in a way that fails to protect and promote the
adolescents' well-being.
Another possibility under the current status of the law is that minors with
deeply held religious convictions will be prevented from acting according to
their beliefs in violation of their autonomy. For instance, it is conceivable
that Gregory Novak was deeply committed to his beliefs, so much so, that
forcing him to undergo a blood transfusion would compromise his religious
integrity. The district court's wholesale rejection of the mature minor
doctrine with respect to treatment refusals fails to adequately protect the
potential that Gregory's decision was ethically deserving of respect as
autonomous.

Acknowledging that the current framework is wanting, but that the mature
minor doctrine has merit, this article now turns to whether the doctrine
should be utilized to permit adolescents to refuse life-saving or sustaining
medical treatment based upon religious beliefs. In other words, is it possible
to measure the religious integrity of adolescents to the point where it is
ethically defensible to allow them to die for their expressed beliefs?

347. In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239, 243 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990).
The trial court in New York indicated the same anxiety when it declared Philip immature,
though it did not expressly identify its reasoning for this finding. The court did note that
there was no indication that Philip was encouraged to make the decision on his own. Id.
at 242-43. See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
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V. RELIGIOUS INTEGRITY AND MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING

Situations involving the refusal of medical treatment based upon religious
beliefs are not simply medical in nature, and therefore, addressing the
patient's understanding of the medical aspect of the decision alone is
insufficient. In fact, in the cases presented in this article, the decisions to
refuse medical treatment were based solely or primarily upon religious
beliefs. The parents of Kevin Sampson, Ricky Green, Ernestine Gregory,
and Philip Malcolm consented to medical procedures aimed at alleviating
their children's ailments. 348 These decisions were medical in nature taking
into account-assuming informed consent was obtained--diagnoses, risks,
for success associated with the procedures, and feasible
and the potential
34 9
alternatives.
The parents of Kevin and Ricky were willing to subject their children to
risky surgical procedures, though their lives were not at risk from the
underlying condition, in the hopes that they would have a better life. The
parents of Ernestine and Philip wanted their children to undergo cancer
treatments despite the fact that the cure rate was no higher than twenty-five
percent. The refusal of these treatments was not based upon relative risk or
success; rather the parents refused based upon their religious prohibition on
the administration of blood transfusions.
It is well settled that parents may not refuse medical treatment based upon
religious beliefs where to do so would put their children's lives at risk; the
State as parens patriae has the duty to intervene and order the necessary
treatment. 350 Again, this intervention is based upon the presumption that
adults may choose to die for their beliefs, but they may not "make martyrs of
their children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion
when they can make that choice for themselves." 35 1 While the parents may
believe that death furthers their own and their children's well-being more so
than would the given medical treatment, the State reserves that
determination for the child upon reaching decision-making capacity. In
order to avoid this interference, some parents and children have argued that
the decisions were made by the children as mature minors; and as such, with
the full and legal discretion to decide for themselves.
In theory, the mature minor doctrine requires ascertaining whether
adolescents have developed underlying and enduring aims and values, and
thus, decision-making capacity or the ability to make autonomous decisions.
When adolescents are willing to die for their religious beliefs, an inquiry is
required not just into the ability of the minors to appreciate their medical

348.

Shannon Nixon's parents, on the other hand, refused all medical treatment.

349.
350.
351.

See supra Part 1I.
Seesupra Part II.
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944).
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circumstances, but also into their religious integrity. Only then can
practitioners be sure that the decisions are the adolescents' own.

A. ConsiderationofAdolescent Religious Beliefs in the Law
The maturity of minors is given relatively little weight in the context of
children's religious rights. 352 Most cases even addressing the religious rights
of minors involve situations where the "children's interests identified match
the parents' interests, or indeed, the parents are the actual motivating force
behind the litigation.'' 353 The courts deciding these cases frequently do not
distinguish between the religious interests of the parents and their children,
leading some commentators to believe that the cases are decided solely upon
the parents' claims.354 Where the courts attempt to disaggregate the interests
of the parents and children, scant attention is paid to the centrality of the
children's religious beliefs to their lives.
It is fitting to return to Justice Douglas's partial dissent in Yoder. Indeed,
Douglas partially dissented from the majority's opinion because only two of
the three children were not consulted regarding their religious views and
preference to withdraw from school after the eighth grade. 355 Frieda Yoder,
on the other hand, gave testimony that she wanted to withdraw from school.
That testimony, in relevant part, is as follows:
Q: [by parents' counsel]: Frieda, I won't ask you many questions,
how old are you?
A: 15
Q: Do you believe in the Amish religion?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you want to live according to the way of your people?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you live that way now?
A: Yes.
Q: Would your going to high school be against your religious
belief, Frieda?
A: Yes.

352. Note, Children as Believers: Minors 'Free Exercise Rights and the Psychology of
Religious Development, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2205, 2208 (2002) [hereinafter Children as
Believers].
353. Buss, supra note 72, at 61-62.
354. Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2210 (citing Emily Buss, The
Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1240 n.22 (2000)).
355. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 243 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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That is All.
Q: [by counsel for the State] Defense counsel asked, and I think
you said that you wanted to be brought up in the Amish religion, is
that right?
A: Yes.
Q: Now Frieda, otherwise you would be able to attend high school
physically, if you were free of religion you could attend, you could
walk or get there on the bus?
A: Yes
Q: So I take it then, Frieda, the only reason you are not going to
school, and did not go to school since last September, is because
of your religion?
A: Yes
That is all.356
Douglas wrote his dissent because he was concerned that the majority's
opinion served to "impose the parents' notions of religious duty upon their
357
children," without discerning the children's actual religious convictions.
Apparently, Frieda's testimony was sufficient to dispel his concerns and
convince him of the depth of Frieda's beliefs such that she was "mature
enough to have [her] desire respected., 358 Because Douglas's dissent was
grounded on the fact that the other two children were not consulted,
presumably, had they been asked questions similar to Frieda, he would have
joined the majority opinion.
For obvious reasons, this inquiry provides little guidance concerning the
authenticity of a child's religious beliefs. It is unclear from a few yes/no
questions whether the choice to leave school was formulated by Frieda on
her own, without undue influence or pressure from her parents or religious
The decision to withdraw from school has less severe
community.
consequences than a life or death decision to refuse medical treatment, and
would require a lesser showing of competency, but Frieda's limited
testimony fails to supply even this. Since Yoder, the Supreme Court of the
United States has not offered further guidance concerning adolescent
religious claims.
In 1993, a district court in Texas decided an interesting case involving
Native American students. 359 Although the members of the Tribes in
question converted to Christianity years before, certain younger members

356.

Buss, supra note 72, at 67 n.61.

357.
358.

Yoder, 406 U.S. at 242.
Id.

359. Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Tr.of Big Sandy Indep. Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp.
1319 (E.D. Tx. 1993).
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360
returned to some of the traditional ways, including wearing their hair long.
The school dress code prohibited boys from wearing their hair longer than
their shirt collar, and the students were punished for violating it. The
suit raising violations of their First and
students and their parents brought
36
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
As practicing Christians, the boys' parents did not require them to wear
their hair long, but they did support the boys' desire to do so. The court
detailed testimony from two boys in particular who indicated that wearing
long hair was part of their Native American heritage, which both also
demonstrated through participation in ceremonial dances. 362 With this
information, the court concluded that the boys had sincerely held religious
beliefs worthy of protection. The court also found in favor of the parents'
363
claim relating to their right to direct their children's religious training.

The Big Sandy court appeared to give great weight to the religious beliefs
presented by the boys as evidence of the sincerity of their beliefs. On the
other hand, the "court assigned substantial weight to the parents' support of
their children's religious practice," 364 decreasing the authority of the
children's independent religious decision.
One of the most oft-cited cases in recent literature 365 on the ability of
children to assert independent religious beliefs was decided by the
Pennsylvania Superior Court.3 6 6 Zummo involved a custody dispute between
a Jewish mother and a Roman Catholic father. 367 The mother was awarded
primary physical custody, but the couple went to court regarding a dispute
about the father's wish to take the children to Catholic services, and his
the children to Jewish Sunday School diminished his
complaint that 3taking
68
visitation time.

The trial court entered an order preventing the father from controlling his
children's religious education, holding that the "children had been
'assiduously' grounded in the Jewish faith, and the children should be
The superior court
permitted to continue in 'their chosen faith.

360. Id.at 1325.
361. Id. at 1323.
362. Id. at 1325-26.
363. Id. at 1334.
364. Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2213.
365. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 72, at 70-71; Zaven T. Saroyan, SpiritualHealing and
the Free Exercise Clause: An Argument for the Use of Strict Scrutiny, 12 B.U. PUB. INT.
L. J. 363, 383 n.143 (2003).
366. Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
367. Id at 1141.
368. Id.
370. Id. at 1148.
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disagreed with the trial court's finding that the children, then aged three,
four, and eight, "chose" Judaism as their faith, and thus, "asserted personal
371
religious identities which were entitled to consideration and protection."
Significantly, the court noted that "parents and religious leaders define a
child's religious identity under the rules of the religion they practice," and
"[o]ften such rules impose a presumed religious identity upon a child
without requiring the child's consent or understanding, on the basis of a
parent's religion." 372 In light of this, the court went on to state that "courts
only recognize a legally cognizable religious identity when such an identity
is asserted by the child itself, and then only if the child has reached sufficient
maturity and intellectual development to understand the significance of such
an assertion. 37 3 Although the Pennsylvania court speaks to a notion of
religious identity, because the children were so young, it did not specifically
have had to show to establish independent,
address what the children would
374
cognizable religious rights.
A seemingly contrary result was reached by the Ninth Circuit in Cheema
v. Thompson.375 In this case, three Khalsa Sikh children and their parents
sought a preliminary injunction against the weapons ban utilized by the
children's school as applied to their wearing of ceremonial knives called
kirpans. 376 One of the central tenets of the Sikh religion is to wear five
symbols of the faith at all time. 377 In upholding the district court's grant of
the injunction, the circuit court did not clearly disaggregate the religious
interests of the parents and children. Without pointing to any specific facts
in the record, however, the majority of the court suggested that the children
on wearing kirpans was animated by a
insistence
had proved that "their 37
8
sincere religious belief.,
In a powerful dissent, Judge Wiggins immediately pointed out that the
children in question were aged seven, eight and ten-years-old. 379 He
expressed concern that although the religion dictates that kirpans may only
be used in "self defense and the propagation ofjustice," the record indicated
that the children had been seen playing with their knives, and in at least one
instance, a Cheema child purportedly threatened to use his knife against

Id.
Id. at 1148-49.
Id. at 1149.
374. The court ultimately held that preventing the father from taking his children to
Catholic services would violate his free exercise rights. Id. at 1150.
375. 67 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995).
371.
372.
373.

376. Id. at 884.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 885.
379. Id. at 886 (Wiggins, J., dissenting).
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another student. 380 Judge Wiggins agreed with the district court's initial
finding that "[n]othing in the present record suggests that the instruction or
advisement given to these children prior to their initiation as Khalsa Sikhs,
or that their oath of religion, would divest them of the demeanor, maturity
and judgment which equate with their childhood. 381 In other words,
substantial evidence weighed against a finding that the children had
sincerely held beliefs which they fully understood and could apply to their
life-plan.
The limited cases addressing the religious expression of children are as
inconsistent and provide as little guidance as those involving the mature
minor doctrine. The decisions in the aforementioned cases imply that
certain children are capable of establishing their own independent religious
identities; and although the courts suggest notions of sincerity and maturity,
they do not provide guidance as to accurate measures of the same. That
being said, the majority opinion in Zummo, and Judge Wiggins's dissent in
Cheema at least attempt to establish a conception of religious identity for
minors. The opinions point to the intellectual development of the children in
question as well as their understanding of how religious beliefs shape
various life activities and decisions.
The thesis of this article is that only adolescents demonstrating authentic,
sincerely held religious beliefs that are central to their lives should be
permitted to refuse life-saving or sustaining medical treatment based upon
those beliefs, thus dying for them. Recall that in Part I of this article three
capacities were listed as necessary for decision-making competence; the
third being the capacity to have and apply a set of values. This set of values
must be relative to a particular decision, and "at least minimally consistent,
stable, and affirmed as his or her own." 382 When the values are religious in
nature, and the particular decision involves a life or death determination,
minimal stability of beliefs affirmed as one's own necessitates a finding of
religious integrity. In this way, practitioners can attempt to discover whether
what the adolescent expresses will truly satisfy his or her underlying aims
and values; and therefore, that the decision is in accord with his or her
conception of well-being.

380. Id. at 890-9 1.
381. 67 F.3d at 891. The district court first ruled against the injunction but was
reversed by the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 884.
382. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 25.
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B. Religious Integrity
At the outset, it should be noted that expressly sincere religious beliefs are
not necessarily integral and defining in a person's life. 383 This is important
because the Supreme Court of the United States is largely deferential to the
expressed sincerity of an adult's religious beliefs in its Free Exercise
jurisprudence. Yet, when an adolescent seeks to die for his or her religious
values, the state's duty as parens patriae mandates the presentation of more
than a mere expression of sincerely held beliefs. 384

1. CharacteristicsofReligious Integrity
Integrity in personal values refers to "soundness, reliability, wholeness,
and integration of moral character;" to "fidelity in adherence to moral
norms." 385 Those with religious integrity have integrated their religious
beliefs into a coherent sense of self, and live in a way that is faithful to their
deeply held values. In this way, their beliefs become "integral to [their] selfconception or identity. ' 386 Conversely, persons without religious integrity
demonstrate a "lack of sincerely held, fundamental moral convictions,"387
and
thus act in a way that is inconsistent with firmly held moral convictions.
Individuals often justify actions or refusals to act on the ground that to do
otherwise would sacrifice their integrity. 388 In other words, that their
underlying and enduring aims and values shape their identity and guide
every aspect of their life, such that requiring them to act contrary would be a
gross violation of their autonomy. The refusal of medical treatment based
upon religious beliefs is akin to an objection based upon the person's
conscience.
When individuals refuse to act in a certain prescribed way, they do so
under what is commonly referred to as conscientious objection.
For
instance, physicians may seek to avoid performing controversial procedures,
such as abortion or physician-assisted suicide when patients so request.
Refusing to treat the patient could be viewed as a breach of the physician's

383. Gary K. Leak & Stanley B. Fish, Development and Initial Validation of a
Measure of Religious Maturity, 9 INT'L J. PSYCHOL. RELIGION 83, 85 (1999).
384. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-12, at 1242 (2d ed.
1988). Simply put, those with sincere religious beliefs know and adhere to the tenets of
their faith which guide their lives. Courts are largely deferential to litigants claiming to
be religiously motivated. Id. at 1243-46.
385. BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 35-36.
386. Mark R. Wicclair, Conscientious Objection in Medicine, 14 BIOETHICS 206, 214
(2000).
387.

BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 36.

388.

Id. at 35.

Spring 2006]

My God My Choice

duty to act in the patient's expressed best interests, but many ethicists argue
that physicians should not be forced to act in a way that violates their
personal moral integrity. 389 Mark Wicclair suggests that the moral weight
given to the physician's objection is a function of the "centrality of 39the
0
beliefs upon which they are based to the physician's core ethical values."
Conscientious objection also occurs frequently with respect to military
duty. During the draft associated with the Vietnam War, many individuals
objected to joining the war effort based upon appeals to conscience. The
statute authorizing the draft provided an exception for individuals
conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form by reason of
religious training and belief.391 In a series of cases related to conscientious
objectors, the Supreme Court of the United States established that decisions
based upon conscientious objection "must be sincere and not based on
political grounds; nor may [they] be a simple matter of expediency or selfinterest." 392 Further, "[t]o act conscientiously is to act in the honest and
sincere belief that what one is doing is morally right, even if it is illegal. 393
The language of the Court's decision in Welsh v. United States is
explicative. Elliot Welsh was convicted for violating the federal statute that
mandated he submit to induction to the Armed Forces because, although he
had strong beliefs opposing the war, those beliefs were not religiouslybased.394 In reversing Welsh's conviction, the Supreme Court first made
clear that conscientious objection does not apply to "those whose beliefs are
not deeply held and those whose objection to war does not rest at all upon
moral, ethical, or religious principle but instead rests solely upon
considerations of policy, pragmatism, or expediency." 395 The Court relied on
Welsh's testimony:
I believe that human life is valuable in and of itself; in its living;
therefore I will not injure or kill another human being. This
belief.., is essential to every human relation. I cannot, therefore,

389.

Wicclair, supra note 385, at 213-17. The rights of physicians to refuse to act

upon conscientious objection in less controversial areas, such as prescribing birth control
or participation in palliative, end-of-life care is less clear. See, e.g., BEAUCHAMP &
CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 38.
390. Wicclair, supra note 385, at 221.
391. Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 335 (1970).
392. Alfred J. Sciarrino & Kenneth L. Deutsch, Conscientious Objection to War:
Heroes to Human Shields, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 59, 67 (2003).

393.

Id. at 75.

394.

Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335.

395. Id. at 342-43. Further, given the presumption that adults generally act in
accordance with a well-conceived life plan, the burden is on the government to prove that
the beliefs are not sincerely held. See Duane Zezula, Religious Accommodation in the
Military, 1987 ARMY LAW 3, 8 (1987).
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conscientiously comply with the Government's insistence that
396 I
assume duties which I feel are immoral and totally repugnant.
The Court was persuaded that Welsh's convictions were "spurred by deeply
held moral, ethical or religious beliefs" to the extent that requiring him to
"become an instrument of the war" would give him "no rest or peace." 397 In
other words, his beliefs were so tied to his sense of well-being that to order
him to act contrary would cause "self-betrayal and loss of self-respect," 398 in
clear violation of his autonomy.
Like conscientious objectors to war, adults who refuse medical treatment
based upon their religious convictions do so under the belief that to act
otherwise would cause grave harm to their sense of well-being. In choosing
to die for their beliefs, these adults are presumed 399 to have religious
integrity, marked by a deeply rooted self-conception that is founded in
religious values and is so central to the person's life that it guides daily
activities and decision-making.
Religious integrity is different than a conception of what might be called
religious maturity. In the seminal work on religious maturity, Gordon
Allport suggested that "strenuous thinking [is] demanded of every aspirant
seeking religious maturity." 400 He stated that those with religious maturity
do not accept religion "unreflectively and uncritically;" rather, they arrived
at their beliefs through "reflective examination and questioning. 4 °1 Allport
concluded that mature religious beliefs are "well differentiated, comprising
many subsidiary attitudes, critically arrived at, and flexibly maintained as
the sphere of experience widens."4 02 In turn, those with religious maturity
possess "[a] mature sentiment... [representing] a style of existence that the
individual has adopted after considerable reflection as a means of relating
himself to life. 40 3
From a philosophical standpoint, the ideal may be for individuals to
achieve Allport's sense of religious maturity, but it is an impossibly high
standard by which to hold the general populace. Indeed, he pointed to

396. Welsh, 398 U.S. at 343 (emphasis in original).
397. Id. at 344.
398. Wicclair, supra note 385, at 214.
399. Unlike military conscientious objection-where an inquiry into the individual's
religious integrity is triggered by the otherwise illegal action of avoiding military
service-no inquiry into religious integrity is required when an adult objects to medical
treatment based upon religious beliefs. Because adolescents are presumed to lack
religious integrity, an inquiry is mandated by the government asparenspatriae.
400.

GORDON W. ALLPORT, THE INDIVIDUAL AND His RELIGION: A PSYCHOLOGICAL

INTERPRETATION 46 (MacMillan Paperbacks ed. 1960) (1950).
401. Id. at 59-60.
402. Id. at 63.
403. See id. at 127.
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brilliant minds such as Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and Soren
Kirkegaard as the epitome of religious maturity for which people should
strive;404 and in later works he abandoned some of the elements he originally
associated with religious maturity. 405 Thus, it presents an unworkable
standard with regard to adolescents who object to medical treatment based
upon their religious beliefs.

2. Adolescent Development and Religious Integrity
Although courts seem loathe inquiring into the religious identities of
children and adults, substantial scholarship exists contemplating religious
development. 4° 6 Ronald Goldman mapped religious thought development
onto three of Piaget's stages in the development of operational thinking: (1)
407
He found that
intuitive (pre-operational), (2) concrete, and (3) abstract.
by age fourteen many adolescents entered the final stage, and were at least
capable of more mature, abstract religious thinking. 408 Goldman
acknowledged, and later studies supported, that age is not a bright line
indicator of religious thought development. For example, recent scholarship
suggests that "[b]oth children's and adults' god concepts are limited by
context demands in their cognitive complexity" such that the "concrete-tobut instead may
abstract shift may not occur over the course
40 9 of development
manifest from one situation to another."
Elizabeth Ozorak theorized that "[a] model of religious development in
adolescence should be grounded in the process of maturation, especially in
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Id. at 46.
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Leak & Fish, supra note 382, at 84.
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See generally RONALD GOLDMAN, RELIGIOUS THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO

ADOLESCENCE (Western Printing Services Limited 1965) (1964); Elizabeth W. Ozorak,
Social and Cognitive Influences on the Development of Religious Beliefs and
Commitment in Adolescence, 28 J. ScI. STUD. RELIG. 448 (1989); Justin L. Barrett, Do
Children Experience God as Adults Do?, in RELIGION IN MIND: COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVES
ON RELIGIOUS BELIEF, RITUAL, AND EXPERIENCE 173 (Jensine Andresen ed. 2001).
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GOLDMAN, supra note 405, at 51-67.

408. Id. at 63. See also Carol A. Markstrom, Religious Involvement and Adolescent
Psychosocial Development, 22 J. OF ADOLESCENCE 205, 205 (1999) (finding that "with

the onset of formal operational thought, adolescents are capable of the consideration of
abstract concepts.").
409. Barrett, supra note 405, at 187. Justin Barrett found that although they have the
capacity to think abstractly, when faced with difficult cognitive pressure, adults revert to
simpler more anthropomorphic concepts of religious thought.

Id. at 186 (citing J. L.

Barrett, Cognitive Constraints on Hindu Concepts of the Divine, 37 J. FOR SCI. STUDY
RELIGION 608-19 (1998) and J.L. Barrett and F.C. Keil, Conceptualizinga Non-natural
Entity: Anthropomorphism in God Concepts, 31 COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 219-47 (1996)).
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cognitive changes, but it should also weigh the influences of the parents and
their chosen religious organization (if any) against the more diverse
influences of peers. 4 1° In other words, religious development does not
occur in a vacuum; "children actively process the information they receive
and draw inferences from it. ''4 11 The ultimate question, then, is whether
adolescents have the ability to express religious identities independent of
third parties: do they have the capability to formulate a deeply rooted selfconception that will promote their well-being based upon their
understanding of their religious values?
Robert Coles, a pediatric psychiatrist, performed a study involving the
religious experiences of hundreds of children.4 12 Coles found that "his
subjects revealed an intense interest in an engagement with traditionally
religious questions and concepts," in a way that made their beliefs central to
their lives. 413 Centrality alone, however, is not sufficient. For instance, the
Cheema children's religious beliefs played a central role in their lives, but
that does not mean that the children had the cognitive capacity to establish a
self-identity based upon those beliefs. This requires a greater degree of
sophistication than younger children likely possess. On the other hand, the
studies reported in Part III of this article, coupled with those involving
religious development, suggest that that many adolescents have the cognitive
capacity to formulate deeply rooted religious identities.
An inquiry into religious integrity must seek to ascertain whether the
adolescent's beliefs are deeply held and tied to his or her sense of wellbeing. Only then should the adolescent be deemed competent to make
decisions based upon those beliefs. The level of inquiry required depends
upon the circumstances of the decision in question.

C. Competence Required to Refuse Life-Saving or SustainingMedical
Treatment Based Upon Religious Beliefs
Inquiries into religious integrity and medical decision-making competence
are not mutually exclusive. In fact, an "adequate standard of competence
will focus primarily not on the content of the patient's decision but on the
process of the reasoning that leads up to that decision. ' '414 Further, "[s]etting
the proper level of decision-making competence involves balancing two

410.

Ozorak, supra note 405, at 448. Ozorak points out that "[v]irtually all research

has identified parents as the most important source of religious influence." Id. at 449.
411. Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2224.
412.

Id. at 2221. See generally ROBERT COLES, THE SPIRITUAL LIFE OF CHILDREN

(1990).
413. Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2221.
414. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 50.
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important values: protecting and promoting the4 15
individual's well-being, and
respecting the individual's self-determination."
Competent individuals are thought to be capable of making autonomous
decisions that will promote their well-being. Thus, allowing them to make
their own decisions both respects their autonomy and protects their wellbeing. Inquiries into competence are triggered by situations where there
appears to be a conflict between persons' decisions and their well-being. If
individuals are making truly autonomous decisions, then they know what is
in their best interests and the decisions should stand.
When practitioners inquire into competence, they run the risk of two
errors: (1) that autonomous individuals will be found incompetent and, thus,
have the principle of respect for autonomy violated when a surrogate
decision-maker is appointed; or (2) that incompetent individuals will be
permitted to make harmful, non-autonomous decisions that are contrary to
their well-being. 4 16 Because an individual's conception of well-being is tied
closely to his or her religious beliefs, part of the competency determination
will rest upon the integrity of those beliefs.4 17
This being said, Buchanan and Brock suggest "two central questions for
any process standard of competence: (1) "how well must the patient
understand and reason to be competent?" and (2) "[h]ow certain must those
persons evaluating competence be about how well the patient has understood
and reasoned in coming to a decision? ' 418 As the
level of required
41 9
competence increases, so too does the level of certainty.
Recall that the determination of competence requires an inquiry into "a
particular person's capacity to perform a particular decision-making task at a
particular time and under specified conditions." 420 For purposes of this
article, the task involves the refusal of medical treatment based upon
religious beliefs.
Ethically speaking, this is important because the
competencies required to consent to and refuse medical treatment are not
necessarily equivalent.

415. Id. at 84.
416.

BUCHANAN&

BROCK, supra note 35, at 40-41.

417. A process standard of competence takes reasoning into account during the
competency determination. This is different than first evaluating competency and then
inquiring into the rationality of the given choice. Charles Culver and Bernard Gert
advocate the latter position, whereby a competent person's decision may be overridden if
found to be irrational. Id. at 65-68. From a legal standpoint this approach is troubling
given the great deal of decision-making protection offered to competent individuals. See
supra Part V.B. 1.
418. BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 51.
419. Id at 85.
420. Id. at 18. See also supra Part 1.
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Buchanan and Brock suggest a sliding scale and supply this example:
"consent to a low-risk life-saving procedure by an otherwise healthy
individual should require only a minimal level of competence, but refusal of
that same procedure by such an individual should require the highest level of
competence. ' 42 1 Put another way, "[t]he greater the risk relative to other
alternatives-where risk is a function of the severity of the expected harm
and the probability of its occurrence-the greater the level of
communication, understanding, and reasoning skills required for competence
to make that decision. 4 22
Inherent to any sliding scale approach to competence is the potential for
abuse from practitioners. For instance, one evaluating competence could set
the standard so high or low that no person or any person-autonomous or
not-could meet it. In this way, the practitioner would promote his or her
own values, rather than those of the individual in question. Acknowledging
that no test of competence is without error, the sliding scale attempts to
err--out of the two possible errors--on the side that is more ethically
defensible.
Those evaluating the competence of individuals in these circumstances are
looking for two possible defects that would preclude an autonomous
decision: 1) the patient's lack of understanding of the relevant information,
and/or 2) where the choice is not based upon the person's underlying and
enduring aims and values. 423 The latter is implicated more significantly
when adolescents' refusal decisions are made in relation to religious beliefs.
An inquiry into religious integrity would address the issue of whether the
adolescent's decision is truly based upon his or her underlying values, and as
such supportive of his or her true sense of well-being.
When adolescents choose to die for their religious beliefs rather than
accept medical treatment, they are making decisions that their well-being
would be better served through death. By definition, death precludes the
further "deliberation, choice and action that normal humans possess," that
"make it possible for them to form, revise over time, and pursue in action a
conception of their own good. 424 In other words, under error (2), if a low
standard of religious maturity is required, it is possible that allowing the
adolescent to make a non-autonomous decision to die would fail to protect
and promote his or her overall, lifetime well-being. The goal is to avoid

BUCHANAN& BROCK, supra note 35, at 52.
422. Id. at 55. But see BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 25, at 76 (arguing that
the level of competency required should increase with complexity, not necessarily risk).
421.

For purposes of this article it will be presumed that decisions regarding life, death, and

eternal existence are inherently risky and complex, thus requiring a very high level of

competence under either view.
423.
424.

BUCHANAN & BROCK, supra note 35, at 56.

Id. at 38.
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error where possible, but if an error must be made, this would be a greater
harm than failing to respect the adolescents' potential
autonomy under error
425
(I), thus, justifying a higher level of competence.
The answer to the authors' first question then, is that when adolescents
attempt to refuse life-saving or life-sustaining medical treatment based upon
religious beliefs, where death is the expected outcome, a very high level of
competence, marked by a showing of religious integrity, is required.
Further, given the severity of harm associated with refusing life-saving or
sustaining medical treatment, and the high level of competence required to
do so, practitioners evaluating competence should be convinced by a
showing of clear and convincing evidence of the adolescent's understanding
of the medical aspects of the decision and his or her religious integrity.

D. Implications: Utilizing the Mature Minor Doctrine When Adolescents
Refuse Life-Saving or SustainingMedical Treatment Based Upon Religious
Beliefs
To date, the cases that have dealt with the mature minor doctrine are
unclear in the extent to which they empower adolescents adjudged mature.
Several cases limited the decision-making authority of adolescents to
situations where they had agreement from their parents. 426 In the religious
context, such limitation is problematic.
Recall that the mature minor doctrine was utilized in the religious based
refusal cases in an attempt to avoid state intervention triggered by the
parents' refusal of medical treatment on behalf of their children. It is
obvious in these cases that the parents both shared, and in fact inculcated,
these religious beliefs in their children. 427 Therefore, the parents' agreement
with their children's decisions should not be taken as dispositive of the
children's independent religious identity.
Cases could also arise in which the parents disagree with their child's
decision to refuse medical treatment based upon the child's expressed
religious beliefs. At most, the parents' agreement or disagreement should be
evidence taken into account by the fact finder in determining the
adolescent's competence. The principle behind the mature minor doctrine is
to ascertain those minors capable of making autonomous decisions on their
own, thus obviating the need for protection from either their parents or the

425. Note that for adults the paramount principle is respecting autonomy. Thus, the
presumption is that violation of the adult's self-determination is potentially more harmful.
426. Seesupra Parts III & IV.
427. See Ozorak, supra note 405, at 449; Zummo v. Zummo, 574 A.2d 1130, 1148-49
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
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State. Requiring parental consent does not further the goal of the mature
minor doctrine.
The ultimate question, then, and one that needs further study, is what type
of inquiry is required to ascertain the integrity of an adolescent's religious
beliefs? While some courts have suggested simply asking the child what he
or she thinks, this is insufficient. Indeed, many children are intensely
religious, 428 but it does not necessarily follow that their sincerely held beliefs
are their own deeply held convictions that are central to their lives and sense
of well-being.429 An inquiry into integrity should attempt to find actions by

the adolescent that are inconsistent with firmly held moral convictions.
For instance, in one reported case, an adolescent and his mother attempted
to refuse treatment for a sexually transmitted disease based upon their
religious belief in faith healing.43 ° The court ordered the treatment based on
public health concerns, obviating the need to address J.J.'s religious basis for
the refusal.43' If his religious convictions were tested, one has to wonder
how central his beliefs were to his self-conception of well-being. Suppose
J.J.'s religion prohibited fornication, this would certainly be evidence
against a finding that his beliefs were central and guiding in every aspect of
his life. One would have to question why certain tenets are worth upholding,
but not others.
Unfortunately, as previously mentioned, the Supreme Court is hesitant to
inquire into the depth of an adult's religious beliefs. 432 The presumption
being, that adults are competent to make decisions, religious or not, in ways
that promote their well-being. The opposite presumption applies to minors,
such that courts cannot avoid an inquiry into the sincerity and depth of their
beliefs, especially when they seek to die for them. By way of guidance,
Major Duane Zezula points to legal commentators who suggest that an
inquiry into religious sincerity should look to
the history of subscription to a given belief or consistent acts
according to the conscientiously motivated principles; external
indices, such as the [individual's] demeanor or the consistency of
his or her current statements with prior statements and action; and
examination of extrinsic evidence, including patterns of
inconsistent activities or statements.433

428.

David Elkind, Religious Development in Adolescence, 22 J. ADOLESCENCE. 291,

293 (1999).
429. Recall that children obtain their initial beliefs from their parents and possibly
religious ministers. See Ozorak, supra note 405, at 449; Zummo, 574 A.2d at 1148-49.
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See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
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In addition, the courts should require adolescents to explain the
relationship between the centrality of their beliefs and their established sense
of well-being. When asked about the suffering Ernestine would experience
from a blood transfusion, a Jehovah's Witness minister likened it to that of a
rape victim: "'[f]orcing anyone to violate his consideration [sic] is the most
434
painful indignity that an individual could have perpetrated against him."'
In fact, the minister's sentiment is a common argument against violating the
principle of respect for autonomy. 435 Again, however, it is only a violation
if the person's choice is truly autonomous; that is, based on underlying and
enduring aims and values representing a true conception of well-being. It is
possible that Emestine also felt this way, but that was not elucidated at trial.
Given the subjective nature of religious integrity, it is likely impossible to
know for certain how central a given individual's religious beliefs are to
their identity. However, a psychological inquiry is still an improvement
over lawmakers' guesses as to expressed religious sincerity,43 6 especially
where the decision is life or death in nature. When it comes to religious
refusals by adolescents, "[t]he value of the inquiry is not that it can simplify
the analysis but rather that it can facilitate a more intelligent consideration of
the complexities., 437 Further research may extinguish these shortcomings.

CONCLUSION
When adolescents refuse life-saving or sustaining medical treatment based
upon religious beliefs, they must show by clear and convincing evidence that
they both have understanding of the medical aspects of the decisions, and
also that the religious beliefs upon which they are refusing the treatment are
deeply rooted and central to their life-plan. This is not to say that
adolescents never have religious integrity; rather, the concern is that the
children are not expressing values associated with their true sense of wellbeing. When adolescents seek to die for those beliefs, an inquiry must be
made to ensure that they are expressing an independent religious identity
rather than advancing the interests of third parties such as parents or
ministers.
434. In re E.G., 515 N.E.2d 286, 289 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987) (alteration in original).
435. See PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 33, at 58 (arguing that a person's
spiritual well-being is more important than physical well-being). Where a patient is
capable of autonomous decision-making, their decision to further their spiritual wellbeing should not be taken for granted.
436. Children as Believers, supra note 352, at 2221.
437. Emily Buss, The Adolescent's Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control
Between Parentand State, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 1233, 1257 (2000).
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Recall Julie lying awake in her dorm room grappling with her faith. It is
not the result, but the act of this internal, reflective struggle that is important.
As she interacts with her beliefs, she will establish their true role in her life,
and whether they are so central that she is willing to risk her life for them
rather than violate her conscience. In this way, she will come to an
autonomous realization about her identity and true sense of well-being.
Only then is her decision to refuse life-saving or sustaining medical
treatment truly deserving of respect.

